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ABSTRACT
The ECB’s monetary policy has received 
considerable attention in recent years. This is 
less the case, however, for its regular monetary 
policy preparation and decision-making process. 
This paper reviews how the factors usually 
considered as critical for the success of a central 
banking system and the federal nature of the 
Eurosystem are intertwined with its overall 
design and the functioning of its committee 
architecture. In particular, it examines the 
procedures for preparing monetary policy 
decisions and the role of the decision-making 
bodies and the committees therein. We suggest 
that technical committees, involving all national 
central banks (NCBs), usefully contribute to 
the regular processing of a vast amount of 
economic, ﬁ  nancial and monetary data, as well 
as to the consensus building at the level of the 
Governing Council. A federal organisational 
structure, including a two-tier committee 
structure with the Executive Board taking the 
lead in preparing the monetary policy decisions 
and the Governing Council in charge of the 
decisions with collective responsibility for 
them, as well as committee work at the various 
hierarchical levels, contributes to the efﬁ  ciency 
of the ECB’s monetary policy decision-making, 
and thereby facilitates the maintenance of 
price stability in the euro area. A fully-ﬂ  edged 
committee structure has also contributed to the 
smooth integration of non-euro area Member 
States into the Eurosystem’s monetary policy 
decision-making process.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: E42, E58, F33 and F42
Keywords: European economic and monetary 
integration, monetary arrangements, central 
banks and their policies.5
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With the launch of the euro in January 1999, 
responsibility for the single monetary policy in 
the euro area was transferred to a supranational 
central banking system: the Eurosystem. It 
comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the national central banks (NCBs) of those 
EU Member States that have adopted the euro. 
The Eurosystem is led by a decision-making 
body, the Governing Council of the ECB, which 
is in charge of formulating the monetary policy 
of the euro area and sets the necessary guidelines 
for the implementation of its decisions. 
The monetary policy of the ECB has received 
considerable attention in recent years. This is 
less the case, however, for the regular monetary 
policy preparations and the decision-making 
process. This paper explains the workings of 
the Eurosystem’s monetary policy process 
and the role that decision-making bodies and 
Eurosystem committees play therein. In this 
paper, we also look at the evolution of and the 
economic rationale underlying the Eurosystem’s 
structure, as well as explain its federal nature.
To start with, the founders of EMU faced the 
challenge of having no historical blueprint for 
designing a supranational monetary union among 
sovereign states. Yet some historical lessons 
from other past monetary arrangements provided 
some important underpinning, such as that time 
is an essential element in the establishment of 
a monetary union, and that monetary unions 
are always subject to heterogeneity, in the 
presence of which sustainable convergence is 
essential. In addition, several success factors in 
central banking were taken into account during 
the designing of the Eurosystem, including the 
critical role of central bank independence and a 
clear policy goal (i.e. price stability) based on a 
constitutional mandate. 
The blueprint for the Eurosystem was laid down 
in the Maastricht Treaty and the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank. A structure based on 
centralised decision-making and decentralised 
implementation was chosen. Within the 
Eurosystem, the euro area NCBs perform almost 
all the Eurosystem’s operational tasks. On the 
one hand, this federal structure is effective as 
a number of these tasks need an underlying 
regional and national infrastructure that has 
already been established by NCBs. On the other 
hand, a centralised agreement by the Governing 
Council of the ECB on monetary policy and 
other Eurosystem-wide matters ensures that 
decisions are timely and efﬁ  cient. 
Monetary policy decision-making in the 
Eurosystem is based on a two-tier “hub-
and-spoke” committee structure, with the 
Executive Board of the ECB taking the lead in 
preparing the monetary policy decisions and the 
Governing Council in charge of the decisions 
with collective responsibility for them. This 
hub-and-spoke structure ensures both timely 
monetary policy decision-making and regional 
involvement, and at the same time avoids the 
unnecessary duplication of tasks. Monetary 
policy decisions are based on the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy. In this regard, the 
Executive Board plays a special role, because 
its members take the lead in the monetary 
policy preparations and, as members of the 
Governing Council, vote on the monetary 
policy decisions. 
Overall, our international comparison suggests 
that there are many similarities between the 
decision-making bodies of the ECB and the 
monetary policy committees of other central 
banks but also notable differences in terms 
of the speciﬁ   c circumstances applying to the 
Eurosystem’s structure. The optimal size 
of a monetary policy committee depends 
on various factors, such as the size of the 
currency area. At the same time, the size of 
the technical committees may exceed that of 
the policy committees as their main focus is on 
gathering information.
While today monetary policy decisions around 
the world are taken by a central bank committee 
(with rare exceptions), the Eurosystem exhibits 
an important distinguishing feature. The federal 6
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structure of the Eurosystem assigns an important 
role to the technical committees and sub-
committees at the various hierarchical levels 
in terms of assisting the main decision-making 
body (i.e. the Governing Council). Technical 
committees in the Eurosystem process a vast 
amount of economic, ﬁ   nancial and monetary 
data, information and indicators as input to 
the deliberations of the Executive Board and 
the Governing Council of the ECB. The close 
cooperation between ECB and NCB staff within 
such committees enables consensus to be reached 
on the underlying assumptions for monetary 
policy decisions. Hence, the Eurosystem’s 
committee structure allows for a large degree 
of regional involvement in the preparation of 
monetary policy decisions. Working through the 
Eurosystem’s committees and its substructures 
boosts the efﬁ   ciency of the deliberations of 
the Governing Council which sets interest 
rates based on consensus. This is crucial for 
the smooth functioning of the monetary policy 
process, as the decision-making bodies would 
otherwise spend a considerable amount of time 
agreeing on the assumptions. This conclusion-
based approach to monetary policy-making thus 
contributes to the fulﬁ  lment of the Eurosystem’s 
tasks, and ultimately to the maintenance of price 
stability in the euro area. 
The effective level of interaction between the 
ECB and the NCBs in the three phases of the 
monetary policy decision-making process – 
namely  preparation, decision, implementation 
– of course varies. However, in view of the 
federal structure of the Eurosystem, the NCBs 
play an important role. We take the Eurosystem 
staff macroeconomic projections as an example 
in order to illustrate the workings of the 
Eurosystem’s technical committees when it 
comes to preparing timely and high-quality 
contributions for the main decision-making 
body, the Governing Council. While the staff 
projections represent an important contribution 
to the Governing Council’s monetary policy 
decisions, the Governing Council does not 
interfere in the production process of these 
projections, which remain the sole responsibility 
of Eurosystem staff. 
The cooperation in the Eurosystem that is 
achieved through the technical committee 
structure fosters operational efﬁ  ciency  and 
contributes to the realisation of a “system 
identity” and the sharing of common values. 
Furthermore, the fully-ﬂ  edged  committee 
structure has contributed to the smooth 
integration of the non-euro area Member States 
into the Eurosystem’s monetary policy decision-
making process. Hence, the current structure is 
facilitating successive enlargements.7
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I   INTRODUCTION
“... to make all men work together, to show 
them that, beyond their divergences or over and 
above frontiers, they have a common interest.” 
Jean Monnet
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the launch of the euro on 1 January 1999, 
responsibility for the single monetary policy in 
the euro area was transferred to a supranational 
central banking system: the Eurosystem. It 
comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the national central banks (NCBs) of those 
EU Member States that have adopted the euro 
(and that make up the euro area).1 It is led by a 
decision-making body, the Governing Council 
of the ECB, which is in charge of formulating 
the monetary policy of the euro area and sets the 
necessary guidelines for the implementation of 
its decisions.2
The ECB’s monetary policy has received 
considerable attention in recent years.3 This is 
less the case, however, for the regular monetary 
policy preparations and the decision-making 
process. Academics and policy-makers have 
now become more interested in the role of 
monetary policy committees, especially since the 
publication of novel research by Blinder (2004 
and 2006).4 Against a background of the history 
of the Eurosystem and the economic rationale 
for its development, the present paper explains 
the functioning of Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy process and the role of decision-making 
bodies and Eurosystem committees therein to 
a wider audience. In particular, it reviews how 
the factors usually considered as critical for the 
success of a central banking system, as well as the 
federal nature of the Eurosytem, are intertwined 
with its overall design and the functioning of its 
committee architecture, with a special focus on 
the procedures for preparing monetary policy 
decisions and on the role of committees therein. 
The paper suggests that the Governing Council 
reaches decisions in a manner consistent with 
international standards on the functioning 
of monetary policy committees and that the 
participation of NCBs in technical committee 
work at various levels is indispensable for the 
processing and assessment of a wide range of 
economic,  ﬁ   nancial and monetary indicators. 
The latter is also instrumental in the consensus 
building on monetary policy decisions at the 
level of the Governing Council, and thereby 
facilitates the accomplishment of the primary 
objective of price stability. The existence of a 
committee structure at the technical level for 
all functional areas, with participation from 
delegates from the ECB and the NCBs, also 
facilitates the integration of non-euro area 
Member States into the Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy process. 
Four aspects stand out when analysing the 
workings of the Eurosystem. First, the 
European path to Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) is unique in history, as it has 
been based on the concept of a single market 
for sovereign countries. This is quite different 
from most monetary unions in the past, in which 
the prior creation of a political union (a nation 
state) paved the way for the establishment of a 
single market with homogenous conditions for 
enterprises and households. 
Second, the Eurosystem has a federal structure, 
which requires, as far as possible, a decentralised 
set-up. For example, when designing the ECB, 
responsibility for a number of tasks was kept at 
the national level and combined with centralised 
(i.e. supranational) monetary policy decision-
Although the Eurosystem only became operational in 1998, its  1 
individual national central banks were established much earlier: 
for example, the Banque de France was established in 1800, De 
Nederlandsche Bank in 1814, the Nationale Bank van België/
Banque Nationale de Belgique in 1850, the Banco de España in 
1856, the Banca d’Italia in 1893 and the Deutsche Bundesbank 
in 1957.
The NCBs from those EU Member States that do not yet belong  2 
to the euro area participate in the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) but not in the Eurosystem. To help the reader we 
sometime use the term Eurosystem where the Treaty mentions 
the ESCB: that because in practice Eurosystem is meant.
This point has been demonstrated in numerous publications by  3 
researchers, ECB watchers, the ECB, CEPR, and several other 
research institutions. See ECB (2004a) and ECB (2006a).
Policy-makers interest in the subject started with the speech  4 
“Come with me to the FOMC” by former Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) Governor Meyer (1998), followed by 
speeches by FOMC Governor Olson (2004) and the Bank of 
Japan’s Deputy Governor Muto (2007). Norges Bank organised 
a workshop on Monetary Policy Committees in 2007.8
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making. This mix of centralised and decentralised 
elements mirrors the principle of decentralisation, 
as included in the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Statute of the 
ESCB), and as implied by the ownership structure 
of the ECB (i.e. the NCBs are the shareholders 
of the ECB). The NCBs are independent with 
regard to their tasks, but are an integral part of the 
Eurosystem at the same time (see Article 14.3 of 
the Statute of the ESCB). 
Third, European integration has evolved in stages, 
and it is still evolving. After the Treaty of Rome 
had been signed in 1957, it was several decades 
before a single market was established, as the 
national economies needed ample time to adjust 
to the changing market structures. The process of 
monetary integration has also only been gradual, 
following the creation of the “snake” in 1972 and 
the European Monetary System (EMS) with an 
exchange rate mechanism in 1979 and the signing 
of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
Fourth, there have been advancements in economic 
and monetary theory that have had implications 
for the wider appreciation of currency unions and 
best central banking practices (e.g. the enhanced 
role of central bank independence, transparency 
and improved accountability standards). For 
instance, the debate on the optimum currency area 
(OCA) theory  5 led the European Commission to 
adopt the “One Market-One Money” approach in 
the 1980s (see Emerson et al (1989)) and paved 
the way for an overall improved assessment of the 
beneﬁ  ts of currency unions in relation to the costs 
in terms of the loss of autonomy over domestic 
monetary policy. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
describes the speciﬁ   c factors underpinning 
monetary integration and the critical components 
for the success of a central banking system 
in a monetary union. Section 3 reviews the 
Eurosystem’s design, including its evolution 
and committee structure. Section 4 discusses the 
roles of the Governing Council and the Executive 
Board of the ECB and compares them with the 
monetary policy committees of other central 
banks. Section 5 examines the main features of 
the workings of technical committees and their 
role in assisting the monetary policy process 
of the Eurosystem. Section 6 concludes. Some 
arguments and issues that support our discussion 
are presented in a set of boxes and annexes.
See the seminal contributions of Mundell (1961), McKinnon  5 
(1963) and Kenen (1969). An OCA is deﬁ  ned on the basis of 
several properties, including trade openness, the mobility of 
labour and other factors of production, price and wage ﬂ  exibility, 
diversiﬁ   cation in production and consumption, similarity in 
inﬂ  ation rates and inﬂ  ation preferences, and ﬁ  nancial integration. 
Sharing these OCA properties – among countries wanting to form 
a monetary union – reduces the usefulness of nominal exchange 
rate adjustments among them by reducing the impact of some 
types of shock or by facilitating the adjustment thereafter. For 
recent surveys, see De Grauwe (2005), Mongelli (2005) and 
Tavlas (2002).9
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2  THE FACTORS UNDERPINNING MONETARY 
INTEGRATION AND THE EUROSYSTEM
At the outset, the founders of EMU faced a 
key challenge: there was no historical blueprint 
for designing a supranational monetary union 
involving several sovereign countries. A single 
monetary policy without a nation state had to be 
built on new foundations. In this respect, it was 
helpful to take into account lessons learnt from 
other monetary unions and from “best” central 
banking practices concerning monetary policy 
preparations and decision-making. 
2.1   GENERAL FACTORS UNDERPINNING 
MONETARY INTEGRATION 
The Treaty of Rome entails a “functional” 
integration process that is contingent on 
progress in terms of economic integration 
(see Chart 1). This was to be an entirely new path 
towards monetary union. Differences in national 
situations needed to be taken into account when 
designing the central bank structure in order to 
minimise the likelihood of tensions arising from 
safeguarding national interests. 
A degree of decentralisation and NCB 
involvement in the decision mechanism of EMU 
seemed to be indispensable. In European 
monetary history, there have been only a few 
examples of monetary union without political 
union that have proved sustainable over the long 
term. In the past, such frameworks were typically 
applied to a combination of one large and one (or 
more) smaller country/countries, in which the 
large country usually dominated. Examples 
include the currency unions between Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein, France and Monaco, and Italy 
and the Vatican State, plus San Marino. As for 
Chart 1 Economic, monetary and political integration








b) “Functional” integration process (underlying the Treaty of Rome, 1957)
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the relatively recent currency union between 
Belgium and Luxembourg, its functioning was 
very much determined by the inclusion of the 
Belgium franc in the EMS, which was then 
superseded by EMU. Such monetary unions 
generated signiﬁ  cant  beneﬁ   ts for the smaller 
partners (that saved on minting costs and acquired 
better access to ﬁ   nancial markets). From an 
organisational standpoint, there were few lessons 
to be learnt. However, some general lessons could 
be learnt from past monetary unions when the 
monetary constitution for EMU was drafted.6 
First, political union has generally preceded 
economic and monetary union in most monetary 
union (see Chart 1a). Three often cited examples 
are the US monetary union of 1789, the Italian 
monetary union of 1861 and the pan-German 
currency union that was created following 
political uniﬁ   cation in 1876. In these cases, 
the adoption of a common currency was an 
important vehicle for enhancing the unity of the 
new nation states. Political unions also dissolve. 
Monetary history suggests that monetary unions 
typically break down as a result of political 
forces, seldom collapsing as a result of economic 
factors or ﬁ  nancial crises. In the past, monetary 
unions between sovereign nation states were 
most vulnerable to political events, such as war, 
political disunity or political disintegration with 
other areas. For example, the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
into two or more independent nation states 
led to the creation of new currencies and new 
central banks.
See Bordo and Jonung (2003), Capie and Wood (2003),  6 
Krugman and Obstﬂ  ed (2000), Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006), 
and Eichengreen and Sussman (2000). There were also other 
lessons that do not play a direct role in our discussion, including 
the fact that mo&st monetary unions are supported by some form 
of a public risk-sharing facility through a federal budget (such as 
in the United States). 
Box 1
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
The dollar was introduced at roughly the same time as the United States were founded in 1789. 
Throughout much of the 19th century, however, exchange rates between individual states in 
the United States underwent a series of de facto ﬂ  uctuations due to the excessive use of paper 
money of differing quality and the lack of an accepted currency in the form of gold and silver. 
A system of national banks was therefore instituted by the 1863 National Banking Act and 
was in operation until 1913. However, a series of banking panics (in 1873, 1893 and 1907) 
led to the creation of a more centralised banking system. In 1913, the Federal Reserve System 
was established by Congress which passed the Federal Reserve Act and placed it in charge of 
monetary policy. Against the background of severe banking panics in the United States, the 
Act of 1913 required monetary policy-makers to provide an “elastic currency” (meaning that 
the Federal Reserve System should help to avoid ﬁ  nancial crises). Incorporating lessons learnt 
from the Great Depression, the Employment Act of 1946 included the Federal Reserve System 
in the government’s obligation to prevent future recessions. The Great Inﬂ  ation of the 1970s led 
to an amendment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1977, and the ﬁ  rst explicit recognition of price 
stability as a goal for the central bank as part of a “dual mandate”.1
1  As stated in Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open 
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run 
potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates”. The mandate is interpreted as meaning that the role of the Federal Reserve System is to keep inﬂ  ation low and stable.11
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Second, time is an essential component 
of a monetary union and is sometimes 
underestimated.  There are at least two ways 
of looking at it. Prior to the successful 
establishment of a monetary union, monetary 
integration requires time – several decades in the 
case of EMU – to secure a level of sustainable 
convergence sufﬁ   cient to underpin a single 
currency. In order to prepare a sound institutional 
framework for monetary union, substantial lead 
times are normally required. However, this 
aspect may be subject to limitations: monetary 
union in Europe was a project with a clear end 
date for its realisation, i.e. the construction of 
EMU had to advance along a calendar set by 
international treaties and agreements, but the 
timetable was subordinate to the fulﬁ  lment of 
the convergence criteria. After the establishment 
of a monetary union, the process of monetary, 
economic and political integration continues. 
Some historians have ﬂ   agged that, even in a 
large currency area with a federal structure 
like that of the United States, the functioning 
of the central banking system has improved as 
it has evolved. The Federal Reserve System’s 
experience suggests that, even when supported 
by political union and a sound institutional 
framework, the securing of monetary unity and 
a single market across all regions of a monetary 
union may be subject to important challenges. 
Third, monetary unions will always face a 
degree of heterogeneity, making sustainable 
economic convergence an essential factor for 
their sustainability. As shown by the example 
of the Federal Reserve System (see Box 2.1), it 
would be unwise from an economic and political 
viewpoint to ignore the forces that the diversity 
of regional contexts could unleash in terms of the 
way a monetary union functions internally. The 
founders of EMU were aware of the possibility 
that heterogeneity could lead to economic 
divergence, in particular when monetary policy is 
no longer available as an independent instrument 
for addressing regional developments. They 
placed considerable emphasis on achieving 
and maintaining a high degree of economic 
convergence in prices and other economic and 
ﬁ  scal variables prior to the start of EMU. To make 
(nominal) convergence a binding requirement, in 
view of potential subsequent enlargement, these 
criteria were laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The United States were split into 12 Federal Reserve districts that did not coincide with 
individual states or even groupings of states (in fact, many states are apportioned to two or more 
geographical districts). This geographical organisation of the Federal Reserve System was the 
result of a compromise to balance the interests of the banks in the heartland against the interests 
of the New York ﬁ  nancial community. Sustainable central banking systems are capable of 
adapting to and exploiting changes in the economic environment. For example, Regional Reserve 
Banks in the United States maintained the right to set discount rates independently for around 
20 years. During this period, the institutional structure functioned as long as all Regional Reserve 
Banks and the Federal Reserve Board were willing to accept the leadership of the Governor of 
the New York Bank. When the Great Depression hit the US economy, however, the time was 
ripe for new institutional reforms that could settle regional monetary policy disagreements for 
the longer term. The Board’s weak position stemmed from the fact that it did not take the lead in 
the system, but instead functioned mainly as a supervisory review body (Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963)). This led to the founding of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in 1933 with 
the limited mandate of making recommendations on open market operations (which the Federal 
Reserve System had been using since the 1920s). However, it soon became clear that deeper 
reforms were needed to address the structural problems in decision-making. The Banking Act of 
1935 then led to a complete reorganisation of the Federal Reserve System. It made the FOMC 
the decision-making body in charge of monetary policy for the United States as a whole (mainly 
based on open market operations), while the regional Federal Reserve Banks’ autonomy was 
limited to setting discount rates.12
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According to the hypothesis of endogeneity of 
OCA criteria (also known as the “Rose effect”), 
the creation of EMU was to bring the euro area 
countries more in line with the OCA criteria, i.e. 
foster greater convergence.7  Successful monetary 
unions are also capable of maintaining sustainable 
convergence of key economic variables, 
particularly inﬂ   ation rates. Otherwise, lasting 
inﬂ  ation differentials that are not explained by 
catching-up processes could become destabilising 
for a monetary union. Taken at face value, they 
would imply changes in the competitiveness of 
industries at the international level. In the absence 
of corrective actions, however, this might, in turn, 
lead to the loss of domestic production capacity 
and welfare losses in terms of the misallocation 
of production factors.
2.2 CRITICAL COMPONENTS FOR THE SUCCESS 
OF A CENTRAL BANKING SYSTEM IN A 
MONETARY UNION
In designing a blueprint for the Eurosystem, it was 
also important to incorporate a number of critical 
components for the success of central banking, as 
identiﬁ  ed by the experience of central banks with 
a strong record in delivering price stability. We 
brieﬂ  y review several – but by no means all – of 
the Eurosystem’s “building blocks”. 
a. Modern monetary theory has ﬂ  agged  the 
critical role of central bank independence. It is 
widely seen as a prerequisite for the successful 
pursuit of price stability (see Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), 
Alesina and Summers (1993) and the recent 
survey by Arnone et al. (2007)). Central bank 
independence is consistent with the existence 
of a decentralised operational framework for 
monetary policy, whereby decisions on a single 
short-term interest rate are made centrally, 
and it also leaves scope for a central bank to 
evolve over time. It should have, and has in 
most cases, constitutional rank. The studies 
on central bank independence were inﬂ  uential 
in that more attention was devoted to the 
issue in political cycles. Over past decades 
far-reaching reforms of monetary constitutions 
around the world aiming at increasing central 
bank independence have been undertaken. All 
euro area NCBs were made fully independent 
at the time of Stage One of EMU. Annex 1 
provides a further discussion and brief 
analysis of this subject.
b.  Central banks should have a clear policy goal 
based on a constitutional mandate. Central 
bank mandates have evolved over time (see 
the example of the US in box 2.1). Over the 
last two decades, the conclusion that has 
emerged from the academic debate, and that 
is widely shared by policy-makers, is that 
focusing monetary policy on the goal of price 
stability is its best possible assignment, 
reﬂ   ecting the comparative advantages 
between policy instruments and policy 
objectives (see Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City (1996)). Actual practices or 
operational concepts may, however, vary 
somewhat across major industrial countries.8 
c. Most central banks around the world have 
accepted the importance of high standards 
in terms of transparency and clarity. 
Transparency is an attribute with several 
facets touching upon the diverse actions 
(and activities) of the Eurosystem. Its aim 
is to render monetary policy more effective 
by ensuring that the public understands the 
monetary policy objective, as well as the 
preparation and decision-making processes 
behind it. However, transparency is not an 
end in itself (see Annex 2). 
Rose (2000) speciﬁ  ed the conditions under which endogeneities  7 
are likely to emerge. By studying the effects of several currency 
unions that have occurred over the past 25-30 years, Rose and 
Frankel (1997) show that monetary integration can lead to a 
signiﬁ  cant deepening of trade. The implications for EMU are 
that the euro area may turn into an OCA, even if it was not one 
before, or “countries which join EMU, no matter what their 
motivation may be, may satisfy OCA properties ex-post even 
if they do not ex-ante!” For an overview see De Grauwe and 
Mongelli (2005) and Artis (2003). 
Since the early 1990s, many central banks have adopted explicit  8 
inﬂ  ation targets. In some instances, the monetary constitution 
only stresses the importance of price stability as the primary 
objective, without clarifying its meaning or, as is the case for 
the Federal Reserve System, the general view has evolved that 
price stability is a precondition for the achievement of other 
objectives. 13
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d.  Modern central banks have chosen to be 
accountable to citizens for their monetary 
policy. This helps monetary policy to better 
anchor inﬂ  ation expectations and enhance its 
credibility. Accountability is the legal and 
political obligation of a central bank to 
explain and justify its decisions to citizens 
and their elected representatives. High 
standards in terms of accountability provide 
the necessary checks and balances for an 
independent central bank that performs its 
tasks in a democratic society. The process of 
accountability requires the existence of a 
binding mandate against which a central 
bank’s actions can be assessed. 
Accountability normally takes the form of a 
dialogue that involves elected representatives 
(i.e. Parliament, Government) and the central 
bank. In a wider sense, accountability 
includes a broad range of ofﬁ  cial 
communications by the central bank in 
which it explains to the general public how it 
achieves its policy goal.9
Against this background, the ECB has been made subject to  9 
several “ex post” reporting obligations. See ECB (2002) for a 
discussion of the current practices of central banks with regard 
to accountability.14
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3  THE DESIGN(ING) OF THE EUROSYSTEM
On the basis of the above lessons and critical 
components, a blueprint for the institutional 
design of the Eurosystem was developed 
gradually. The Maastricht Treaty established the 
legal elements guaranteeing the independence 
of the Eurosystem, as well as the choice of price 
stability as its primary objective. It also stressed 
that the principle of decentralisation should be 
applied wherever possible. In practice, this means 
centralised decision-making and the decentralised 
implementation of monetary policy. In this section, 
we describe how the evolution and organisational 
structure of the Eurosystem has taken into account 
these lessons and critical components. 
3.1 THE CREATION OF THE EUROSYSTEM 
Monetary cooperation in Europe has gathered 
pace over time. Early approaches in monetary 
coordination date back to the activities of the 
Committee of Governors of the central banks of 
the Member States of the European Economic 
Community (hereinafter referred to as “Committee 
of Governors”), which was founded in 1964 and 
used to meet in Basel.10 One of its major initiatives 
was represented by the Werner Report of 1970, 
which formulated European governments’ aim to 
establish a common currency in Europe. 
Implementation of the report’s recommendations 
were initially hindered by shocks hitting the 
European economy, stemming from severe oil 
price shocks and the collapse of the Bretton-
Woods system, and which had resulted in a lack 
of sufﬁ  cient policy coordination and convergence 
among Member States. Other attempts at exchange 
rate cooperation in Europe followed: in 1972, 
after the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the 
“Snake”, an exchange rate arrangement for 
European countries, was created. Upon the 
establishment of the EMS in 1979 – with its 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) – monetary 
cooperation became closer among several 
European countries and links between several 
NCBs were strengthened (accounts of the 
evolution of these arrangements are provided in 
Scheller (2006), as well as in Zilioli and Selmayr 
(1999)). The aim was to reduce the disruptive 
impact of sizeable exchange rate devaluations and 
to regulate changes in parities. 
A fresh impulse came when the nature of monetary 
cooperation in Europe switched from a loose to 
a closer coordination of monetary policies. In 
June 1988, the European Council appointed a 
Committee chaired by Jacques Delors to propose 
concrete steps leading to EMU. The resulting 
Delors Report speciﬁ  ed a timetable by which EMU 
could be achieved in three stages (see Chart 2) and 
proposed key elements for the institutional design 
of the (future) Eurosystem (see Committee for the 
Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989)). 
This was followed by further negotiations among 
Member States which resulted in the signing of 
Europe’s monetary constitution, the Maastricht 
Treaty, on 7 February 1992.
Stage One of EMU coincided with the 
liberalisation of capital movements in Europe. 
In its blueprint for the ESCB, which took into 
account the experience of the NCBs and strongly 
inﬂ  uenced the Maastricht Treaty, the Committee 
laid down the main principles for creating a 
European central bank. Member States would 
only be able to participate in EMU if they 
showed a high degree of lasting convergence, 
as conﬁ  rmed by the fulﬁ  lment of four economic 
criteria (on inﬂ   ation, long-term interest rates, 
ﬁ  scal debt and deﬁ  cit, and exchange rates). The 
relevant provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
stipulated the setting-up an independent central 
bank with the primary objective of price stability 
(see Box 2). The Eurosystem’s institutional 
framework for monetary policy took into account 
the main elements of the existing frameworks of 
the NCBs prior to its establishment, and aimed 
at implementing best practice. 
The establishment of the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) as a temporary body at the 
beginning of 1994 marked the start of the Stage 
Two of EMU. Responsibility for the conduct of 
monetary policy in the EU remained the preserve 
of the national authorities. The two main tasks 
See Scheller (2004), Deutsche Bundesbank (2005) and  10 
Committee of Governors of the EEC (1993).15
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of the EMI were (i) to strengthen central bank 
cooperation and monetary policy coordination 
(including the assessment of progress in the ﬁ  elds of 
economic and legal convergence), and (ii) to make 
the preparations required for the establishment of 
the ESCB, for the conduct of the single monetary 
policy and for the creation of a single currency in 
Stage Three of EMU. Under the blueprint for the 
Eurosystem, the EMI was also required to carry out 
preparatory work on the regulatory, organisational 
and logistical framework necessary for the ESCB, 
and on the future monetary and exchange rate 
relationships between the euro area and other EU 
countries (see EMI (1995)), covering: 
• the  deﬁ  nition of the concepts and framework 
for conducting the single monetary 
policy and the preparation of the ESCB’s 
operational rules and procedures;
•  the implementation of a single foreign 
exchange policy;
•  the promotion of efﬁ  cient  cross-border 
payments;
•  the collection and harmonisation, where 
necessary, of reliable and timely statistics to 
support the conduct of monetary policy;
•  the supervision of the technical planning 
for the printing and issuing of a European 
banknote;
•  the harmonisation of accounting rules and 
NCB standards, as well as the setting-up of 
an adequate information systems architecture 
for the ESCB.
Chart 2 The three stages of EMU
Complete freedom for capital 
transactions
Increased cooperation
Free use of the ECU (European 
Currency Unit, forerunner
of the €)
Improvement of economic 
convergence
Start of preparatory work for 
Stage Three
Maastricht Treaty enters into 
force (7 February 1992)
STAGE ONE
1 July 1990 Establishment of the
European Monetary Institute 
(EMI)
Ban on the granting of central 
bank credit to the
public sector
Increased coordination of 
monetary policies
Strengthening of economic 
convergence
NCBs become fully 
independent, with price





1 January 1994 Irrevocable fixing of conversion 
rates
Introduction of the euro in 11 
EU Member States
Foundation of the Eurosystem 
and transfer of responsibility
for the single monetary
policy to the ECB
Entry into effect of the intra-EU 
exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM II)




Source: Adapted from ECB’s website.16
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Box 2 
THE EUROSYSTEM’S INDEPENDENCE AND FOCUS ON PRICE STABILITY
The institutional framework of the Eurosystem guarantees central bank independence as 
the main device for protecting monetary policy from political inﬂ  uence, thus facilitating 
the conduct of monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability. Article 108 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaty”) lays down 
the principle of central bank independence for the Eurosystem. When exercising the powers 
and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them, neither the ECB nor the NCBs, 
nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are allowed to seek or take instructions 
from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from 
any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member 
States also have to respect this principle and must not seek to inﬂ  uence the members of the 
ECB’s decision-making bodies. As the NCBs also had to comply with this requirement, it 
was necessary to harmonise the national monetary constitutions prior to EMU in order for 
the Eurosystem (and each NCB) to become independent. 
Other provisions of the Maastricht Treaty further reinforce the independence of the 
Eurosystem with regard to personal, functional and ﬁ  nancial  independence.  Personal 
independence provides the members of the Governing Council with the necessary security 
of tenure and helps avoid any conﬂ  icts of interest. Functional independence provides the 
Eurosystem with all the instruments it needs to perform its functions. Article 101 of the 
Treaty prohibits any provision whereby the ECB or NCBs could grant credit to the public 
sector using “overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility”. Financial independence 
ensures that Eurosystem has the economic means to fulﬁ  l its mandate. The ECB and the 
NCBs have their own budget, and the ECB’s capital is fully subscribed and paid up by the 
NCBs.
The overriding importance of price stability for the monetary policy decision-making 
process and for communication is captured in the ECB’s mission statement: “The European 
Central Bank and the national central banks together constitute the Eurosystem, the central 
banking system of the euro area. The main objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain 
price stability: safeguarding the value of the euro. We at the European Central Bank are 
committed to performing all central bank tasks entrusted to us effectively. In so doing, we 
strive for the highest level of integrity, competence, efﬁ  ciency and transparency” (see the 
ECB’s website). 
In line with the consideration that price stability should be the main goal of monetary policy, 
Article 105(1) of the Treaty states that “the primary objective of the ESCB [and by extension 
the Eurosystem – ] shall be to maintain price stability” and that “without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the ESCB [and by extension the Eurosystem] shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement 
of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2”. In this respect, Article 2 of the 
Treaty assigns, inter alia, the following tasks to the Community: a high level of employment, 
sustainable and non-inﬂ  ationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence 
of economic performance. The Treaty thus establishes a clear hierarchy of objectives for the 
Eurosystem and assigns overriding importance to maintaining price stability. The Treaty 17
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The EMI Council agreed on a master plan 
as a guiding instrument for the organisation, 
monitoring and assessment of the related 
activities carried out by various areas involving 
experts from the EMI and the NCBs.
On 1 January 1999, the third and ﬁ  nal stage of 
EMU commenced with the introduction of the 
euro in the 11 qualifying EU Member States, 
the establishment of the Eurosystem and the 
transfer of responsibility for the conduct of 
monetary policy to the ECB. At this time, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation 1466/97) 
was already in place and the intra-EU exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM II) came into force. 
3.2   A DECENTRALISED STRUCTURE AND 
CENTRALISED DECISION-MAKING
In deﬁ  ning the appropriate structure for a central 
banking system, there are important a priori 
trade-offs to be considered, in particular that 
between the beneﬁ  ts of decentralisation and the 
speed of decision-making (decisiveness). On the 
one hand, a decentralised set-up is beneﬁ  cial in 
terms of information gathering and taking into 
account all relevant aspects for the discussion. 
On the other hand, it can generate information 
asymmetries between the centre and the regions, 
thus requiring increased coordination efforts by 
the centre. By contrast, a centralised structure 
ensures timely and efﬁ  cient  decision-making 
and implementation, but may disregard full 
involvement of the regions. 
Decentralisation presents a number of tangible 
beneﬁ  ts for the Eurosystem and for any other 
central banking system that is responsible for 
a “large” currency area (in terms of economic 
activity and the number of citizens). It implies 
a diffusion of power that makes it more difﬁ  cult 
for outside pressures to be brought to bear on 
a central bank and hence contributes to its 
credibility. A regional presence helps a central 
bank to communicate its policy message, 
possibly in various languages, and to gather 
anecdotal and specialised information on 
regional economies. Such information gathering 
left it to the Governing Council of the ECB to render this goal operational, thereby allowing 
for both goal independence and instrument independence (see Zilioli and Selmayr (1999), 
Wynne (1999) and Fisher (1995)).1 By contrast, many inﬂ  ation-targeting central banks do 
not enjoy goal independence, as they are subject to speciﬁ  c legislative mandates that set 
an inﬂ  ation target. It is standard practice, however, for central banks to have instrument 
independence, giving them the freedom to choose which instruments they use to pursue 
their goals. 
Price stability is a precondition for sustained economic growth and job creation. Thus, the 
best contribution the ECB’s monetary policy can make to economic growth and the level 
of employment, is to guarantee price stability. The Treaty mandate had to be interpreted 
at the start of EMU. To provide an operational deﬁ  nition of price stability, the Governing 
Council of the ECB announced the following quantitative deﬁ  nition of price stability: “Price 
stability shall be deﬁ  ned as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%” (see ECB (1998)). The ECB’s deﬁ  nition of 
price stability is a lasting quantiﬁ  cation of the primary objective of the single monetary 
policy and is in line with the deﬁ  nitions adopted by most NCBs in the euro area prior to 
Stage Three of EMU. When adopting the broad economic policy guidelines in July 1995, 
ECOFIN indicated that a value of 2% would be the maximum rate of inﬂ  ation compatible 
with price stability.
1  A central bank whose monetary policy goals are not deﬁ  ned precisely is said to have goal independence, i.e. it has the scope to set its 
own goals.18
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and dissemination are particularly important 
when the regional economies are fairly 
heterogeneous. The diversiﬁ  cation of research 
within a system of central banks brings a variety 
of analytical perspectives to policy deliberations 
and contributes to a better understanding of 
the transmission of monetary policy in an 
increasingly complex economy. Moreover, 
decentralisation can enhance competitive forces 
within the central banking system, as well as 
stimulate innovativeness.
Goodfriend (2000) observes that, taking the 
Federal Reserve System as an example, a 
decentralised system needs a strong centre, with 
sufﬁ  cient  stafﬁ   ng levels to support monetary 
policy-makers (see also Box 2.1). The Chairman 
should have the appropriate leadership skills to 
encourage diverse views in the policy committee 
and to build a consensus for decisive and timely 
policy actions. At the same time, the Chairman 
should exploit diversity and promote decisiveness. 
Like the Federal Reserve System, most central 
banks in the world have chosen a structure with a 
strong centre in charge of monetary policy 
decisions, but there may be a different degree of 
regional participation with regard to other tasks. 
In this respect, the Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
structure prior to EMU largely resembled that of 
the Federal Reserve System, consisting of two 
layers: a strong centre and several independent 
regional central banks. The Presidents of the 
regional central banks were members of the 
monetary policy decision-making body (together 
with the members of the Board at the center). 
This system, however, assigned the regional 
central banks key tasks in the implementation of 
monetary policy, including monetary policy 
operations, domestic payment systems and 
banknotes.11 Both systems served as practical 
examples when studying the costs and beneﬁ  ts of 
a high degree of decentralisation as part of the 
development of the Eurosystem’s structure. 
For the Eurosystem setting up a decentralised 
structure approach was the only thinkable 
approach. The Statute of the ESCB emphasises 
the principle of decentralisation. According to 
Article 12.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, “the 
ECB shall have recourse to the NCBs, to the 
extent deemed possible and appropriate, to 
carry out operations which form part of the 
Eurosystem”. The principle of decentralisation 
makes it necessary for the Eurosystem to 
evaluate the extent to which decentralisation of 
its tasks is feasible and desirable. An example 
of the decentralisation of tasks is the operational 
framework of the Eurosystem. The NCBs 
perform almost all the Eurosystem’s operational 
tasks. EMU has also been built with great respect 
for national sovereignty. The important role of 
the NCBs in the Eurosystem is not comparable 
with the sharing of tasks in the decentralised 
Federal Reserve System. Bonzom and Barontini 
(2007) point out that decentralisation has 
additional beneﬁ  ts in the speciﬁ  c case of the euro 
area. As in the above example of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, the NCBs are not only in charge 
of the implementation of monetary policy, but 
they are also involved in the process of monetary 
policy preparation, in particular in the Eurosystem 
staff macroeconomic projections. They provide 
expertise for all central bank functions.
According to Article 105(2) of the Treaty, the 
basic tasks of the Eurosystem include deﬁ  ning 
and implementing the monetary policy of 
the euro area, conducting foreign exchange 
operations, holding and managing the ofﬁ  cial 
foreign reserves of the Member States, and 
promoting the smooth operation of payment 
systems. The scope of the functions and tasks of 
the Eurosystem is similar to that of other central 
banks, such as the Federal Reserve System 
(see Table 1). These institutional frameworks 
are very similar in terms of the functions carried 
out by the central bank, but differ in terms of 
the degree of centralisation. For instance, the 
ﬁ   scal agent function and banking supervision 
function are more clearly assigned within the 
Federal Reserve System. It is also worth noting 
that, within the Eurosystem, the NCBs may 
differ slightly in terms of the scope of their 
tasks (e.g. only some NCBs are genuinely 
See König (1999). Independence at the regional level was  11 
guaranteed by the central bank law, and the Presidents of the 
regional ofﬁ  ces were appointed by the Federal President, based 
on a proposal by the upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat).19
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responsible for banking supervision), although 
they are all responsible for core tasks, such as 
the implementation of monetary policy. 
The mix between decentralisation and centralised 
elements in the Eurosystem may evolve further. 
Moreover, the decentralised set-up of the 
Eurosystem does not imply that the ECB’s 
monetary policy decision-making process focuses 
on regional aspects or is subordinated to regional 
interest groups.12 With a view to ensuring the 
singleness of monetary policy, monetary policy 
decisions are made centrally by the Governing 
Council of the ECB. The Executive Board of the 
ECB, with the help of ECB staff, is in charge of 
preparing the meetings of the Governing Council 
in order to ensure an efﬁ   cient process. The 
involvement of the NCBs boosts the efﬁ  ciency of 
the process, as a number of Eurosystem tasks 
require the existence of a national infrastructure, 
which the NCBs contribute to the Eurosystem-
wide infrastructure. 
3.3 ESTABLISHING THE EUROSYSTEM’S 
COMMITTEE STRUCTURE 
The building of a supranational central bank 
also necessitated a review of the working 
arrangements that had been set up since the 
establishment of the Committee of Governors 
in 1964. For this purpose, the Committee of 
Governors and its sub-committees in 1990 
prepared a draft of the Statute of the ESCB. Then, 
with the ratiﬁ  cation of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 and the establishment of the EMI in 1994, 
links between NCBs became more systematic 
and the need to coordinate decentralised 
activities and supranational decision-making 
was addressed. The EMI Council, as the main 
decision-making body of the EMI, decided 
Monetary policy decisions must be based on a clear euro area  12 
perspective. A clear euro area focus is a central element of 
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. Moreover, members 
of the Governing Council act in person and not as national 
representatives. See ECB (2004a), p. 12.
Table 1 Central banking functions
Function/ Degree of centralisation Eurosystem  Federal Reserve System
The Eurosystem comprises the ECB 
and 15 NCBs 
The Federal Reserve System comprises 
the Board of Governors and 12 Federal 
Reserve Banks








Conducts foreign exchange operations Yes
Mainly decentralised
Yes (on behalf of the Treasury)
Fed New York




Acts as the ﬁ  scal agent for the government 






























Source: Adapted from Pollard (2003).20
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not to change the organisational structure 
established under the Committee of Governors 
(see Chart 3), as it had proved to be an effective 
means of coordinating tasks, processing 
input from various sources and building 
consensus among participants. Within this 
framework, committees, sub-committees and 
working groups composed of NCB experts – 
similar to the Committee of Governors – were 
key players. With the support of the staff of 
the EMI, these committees took the lead in 
conceptual work, such as the design of the 
monetary policy framework. 
A two-tier monetary policy committee structure, 
comprising two main decision-making bodies, 
the Governing Council and the Executive Board 
of the ECB, had to be set up, as the existing 
committee structure was not designed for 
monetary policy decision-making, but for 
coordinating monetary policy among sovereign 
Member States. The experience of other central 
banks, such as the Federal Reserve System and 
the Deutsche Bundesbank suggested that, in a 
geographically dispersed region, monetary 
policy decision-making would be more efﬁ  cient 
if a monetary policy hub-and-spoke committee 
structure were in place.13 This is because such 
structures minimise the costs of gathering and 
sharing information and facilitate consensus 
building. In this regard, Article 112 of the Treaty 
and Articles 10 and 11 of the Statute of the 
ESCB provided for the creation of the Executive 
Board, which acts as the “hub” of the system 
and takes the lead in the preparation of monetary 
policy decisions, and for the creation of the 
Governing Council, which decides on monetary 
policy based on its overall assessment of the 
economic situation. In this respect, NCB 
governors act as the “spokes” of the system.
In view of the success of the structure 
established by the Committee of Governors 
and the EMI, it was natural to use the existing 
architecture for deﬁ  ning working relations and 
taking decisions in the system and to reﬁ  ne it 
where necessary; the mandates of the technical 
committees had to be modiﬁ  ed in order to reﬂ  ect 
their new role within the general structure of 
the central banking system. Today, committees 
are in charge of coordinating the Eurosystem’s 
tasks that involve the NCBs. According to 
Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, 
Eurosystem/ESCB committees are “to assist 
in the work” of the decision-making bodies 
of the ECB.14 Membership of the committees 
is usually restricted to staff of the Eurosystem 
central banks.
However, the NCBs of the Member States 
which have not yet adopted the euro take part 
in the meetings of a committee whenever it 
deals with matters that fall within the ﬁ  eld of 
competence of the General Council.15 Where 
appropriate, other competent bodies, such as 
national supervisory authorities in the case of 
the Banking Supervision Committee, may also 
be invited. Work at various levels contributes to 
shaping views and building consensus within the 
Eurosystem. In terms of expertise or technical 
advice, the structure of committees and sub-
committees provides valuable input in terms of 
expertise or technical advice to the deliberations 
of the ECB’s decision-making bodies through 
letters and reports. 
The current committee structure has evolved over 
time since the establishment of the Committee of 
Governors, as illustrated by the comparison 
shown in Charts 3-5. At present, there are 
committees operating (or touching upon) most 
functional areas of the work of the Eurosystem 
(see Chart 5), including the Monetary Policy 
See, for example, Berk and Bierut (2007). 13 
Eurosystem/ESCB committees report to the Governing Council  14 
via the Executive Board. Note, according to the Rules of 
Procedure of the ECB, “the Banking Supervisory Committee 
shall not be obliged to report via the Executive Board whenever 
it acts as a forum for consultation on issues which are not related 
to the supervisory functions of the ESCB as deﬁ  ned in the Treaty 
and in the Statute.”
The General Council is the third decision-making body of the  15 
ECB, in addition to the Governing Council and the Executive 
Board. The General Council has no responsibility for monetary 
policy decisions in the euro area, and hence will not be discussed 
further here. It carries out those tasks inherited from the EMI in 
relation to the introduction of the euro in the EU Member States 
that have not yet adopted the euro (e.g. the Convergence Report) 
which do not fall under the responsibility of the Governing 
Council. The General Council is composed of the President and 
the Vice-President of the ECB and the Governors of the NCBs of 
the (27) EU Member States.21
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Committee (MPC)  16, the International Relations 
Committee (IRC), the Market Operations 
Committee (MOC), the Statistics Committee 
(STC), the Payment and Settlement Systems 
Committee (PSSC), the Banking Supervision 
Committee (BSC), the Banknote Committee 
(BANCO), the Internal Audit Committee (IAC), 
the External Communications Committee 
(ECCO), the Legal Committee (LEGCO), the 
Accounting and Monetary Income Committee 
(AMICO), the Budget Committee (BUCOM), 
and the Human Resource Conference (HRC). In 
addition, these committees operate a variety of 
working groups or task forces. The number of 
committees has grown somewhat in light of the 
additional tasks to be performed by the 
Eurosystem. For instance, HRC, IAC and ECCO 
were newly created to provide the Governing 
Council with expertise in the ﬁ   elds of human 
resources, internal governance and external 
communication respectively. 
The Monetary Policy Sub-Committee (MPSC) 
of the EMI made an important contribution to the 
preparation of the monetary policy framework 
Note, while the genuine monetary policy committee of the ECB  16 
which is the Governing Council, the term Eurosystem MPC 
refers to a technical committee comprising high-level experts 
from the ECB and the NCBs.








































Source: Adapted from ECB (2007b).23
ECB
Occasional Paper No 79
January 2008
3   THE  DESIGN(ING) 
OF THE 
EUROSYSTEM
and strategy of the ECB. When the ECB was 
founded, the tasks covered by the MPSC were 
split between the Eurosystem Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) and the Market Operation 
Committee (MOC). Today, the Eurosystem 
MPC assists the Eurosystem in terms of the 
single monetary policy and the exchange rate 
policy of the euro area, contributing, inter 
alia, to the assessment of issues relating to the 
conduct of monetary policy in the euro area; 
the review of the underlying tools for assessing 
current economic, monetary and ﬁ  nancial; the 
preparation of a set of economic projections 
concerning the euro area as a whole (see next 
section); the exchange of views and information 
on the economic, monetary and ﬁ  nancial situation 
from a euro area perspective; the assessment 
of the overall performance of the operational 
monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem. 
The MOC has taken over the task of the EMI’s 
Foreign Exchange Policy Sub-Committee 
(FXPSC), which was to prepare discussions on 
exchange rate arrangements. It also assists the 
Eurosystem in the implementation of the single 
monetary policy, including monetary policy 
operations, foreign exchange transactions, the 
management of the ECB’s foreign reserves 
and the operation of ERM II. With regard to 
exchange rate matters, there is some overlap 
between the activities of the MOC, the IRC 
and the MPC. The IRC assists the Governing 
Council in all matters related to international 
cooperation and policy coordination, and acts 
as a forum for the exchange of views on these 
issues. The MPC, however, provides input on 
the potential implications for monetary policy.
3.4 OTHER SOURCES OF COHESION FOR 
ENCOURAGING BEST PRACTICE AND TEAM 
SPIRIT 
In 2005, the Governing Council of the 
ECB agreed on a mission statement for the 
Eurosystem, as well as on a set of common 
values and organisational principles to promote a 
shared identity and successful team work among 
all members of the Eurosystem. The six common 
values agreed for the ECB are: competence, 
effectiveness and efﬁ   ciency, integrity, team 
spirit, transparency and accountability, and 
working for Europe. The nine organisational 
principles include: participation, cooperation, 
transparency and accountability, distinguishing 
Eurosystem activities, cohesion and unity, 
exchange of resources, effectiveness and 
efﬁ  ciency in decision-making, cost efﬁ  ciency, 
measurement and methodology, as well as 
exploit synergies and avoid duplications (see 
Annex 3 for a more detailed description). 
Committee chairpersons also seek to ensure that 
an atmosphere of trust prevails among committee 
members, and aim to foster a participatory team 
spirit. In line with the aims of the Eurosystem’s 
mission statement, the committee structure 
contributes to good governance and helps the 
Eurosystem to perform its tasks effectively 
and efﬁ   ciently in a spirit of cooperation and 
teamwork. In this regard, it is important to 
pursue an approach that clearly deﬁ  nes  roles 
and responsibilities for all members of the 
Eurosystem.24
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4  MONETARY POLICY BY COMMITTEES: 
GENERAL RATIONALE, PRACTICE AND THE 
ECB’S CHOICES
A unique feature of the Eurosystem is that the 
decision-making bodies of the ECB and the 
Eurosystem’s committees include members 
from each euro area country and that voting 
is based on consensus, thus enabling the full 
diversity of views and experiences across regions 
to be incorporated. However, this means that 
the preparations and discussions on monetary 
policy need to be structured in such a way that 
timely monetary policy decisions can be made. 
Our discussion takes into account the fact that 
the delegation of monetary policy decisions to a 
committee like the Governing Council is a feature 
shared by many central banks today. Decision-
making by committees is widely seen as best 
practice in monetary policy, because committees 
have a comparative advantage in capturing the 
plurality of views and in information gathering, 
and, in the case of the Eurosystem, they ensure 
consistency across countries and time. Following 
a federal, decentralized approach, no other 
decision-making process was thinkable. Blinder 
(2006) describes “monetary policy by committees” 
as a “quiet revolution” in central banking. 
Similarly, Vandenbusche (2006) suggests that 
committees could enhance the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. 
This section considers the impact of the 
Eurosystem’s federal structure on the preparation 
and adoption of monetary policy decisions and 
explains how monetary policy decisions are 
made in practice.17 In order to explain and assess 
the choices made in setting up the decision-
making bodies of the ECB, we provide an 
international comparison of practices adopted 
by monetary policy committees and address the 
implications of cultural and economic diversity 
in the euro area for the monetary policy decision-
making process. 
4.1 THE DECISION-MAKING BODIES OF THE ECB
Monetary policy in the Eurosystem is based 
on a collective decision-making system 
(see Articles 107 and 110 of the Treaty). This 
applies to the main decision-making bodies 
(the Governing Council, the Executive Board 
and the General Council of the ECB) and, in 
practice, to the Eurosystem’s committees and 
their substructures. 
The  Governing Council consists of the (15) 
governors of the euro area NCBs and the six 
members of the Executive Board. Its main 
responsibilities include formulating monetary 
policy for the euro area, as well as adopting the 
guidelines and taking the decisions necessary to 
ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to 
the Eurosystem. It is, however, also the decision-
making body for the other tasks of the ESCB. 
When making monetary policy decisions, the 
Governing Council acts by simple majority. 
Each member of the Governing Council has one 
vote; in the event of a tie, the President shall 
have the casting vote (see Article 10.2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB).18 This democratic element 
of monetary policy aims to better anchor 
legitimacy of monetary policy in the regions, to 
facilitate communication with a heterogeneous 
public and to ensure that the regions participate 
appropriately in monetary policy decision-
making. In practice, however, the Governing 
Council practices consensus voting. The size of 
the Governing Council depends on the number 
of euro area countries. Article 10.2 of the Statute 
of the ESCB sets the maximum number of 
voting rights at 21 (i.e. 15 governors and the six 
Executive Board members should have a voting 
right (see Box 3)).
See also Bonzom and Barontini (2006) on the implications of the  17 
federal structure at the NCB level.
Article 10.2 of the Statute of the ESCB states: “Each member  18 
of the Governing Council shall have one vote. As from the date 
on which the number of members of the Governing Council 
exceeds 21, each member of the Executive Board shall have one 
vote and the number of governors with a voting right shall be 15. 
The latter voting rights shall be assigned and shall rotate … Save 
as otherwise provided for in this Statute, the Governing Council 
shall act by a simple majority of the members having a voting 
right. In the event of a tie, the President shall have the casting 
vote.”25
ECB
Occasional Paper No 79
January 2008







VOTING MODALITIES AND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
In order to ensure timely and efﬁ  cient decision-making in an enlarged Governing Council, the 
Eurosystem initiated a reform of the voting modalities in the Governing Council (see ECB, 
2003). On 21 March 2003, the EU Council approved an amendment to the Statute of the ESCB 
which provides for an adjustment of the voting modalities in the Governing Council. According 
to the new voting scheme, the six members of the Executive Board will maintain a permanent 
voting right, whereas the voting rights of the NCB governors will be subject to a rotation scheme 
once the number of euro area countries exceeds 15. (In 2008, the euro area comprises exactly 
15 countries). All governors will participate in all meetings of the Governing Council, irrespective 
of whether they hold a voting right at the time. The maximum number of voting rights in an 
enlarged Governing Council will be limited to 21 in total. The aim of this system is to ensure 
even representation between small and large countries in monetary policy decision-making and 
an efﬁ  cient decision-making process in a large monetary policy committee. It is consistent with 
the Maastricht Treaty that speciﬁ  es the inclusion of NCB governors in the Governing Council, 
but ultimately leaves open the national composition of the decision-making bodies.1
The new voting system borrows the idea of a rotation scheme for votes from the FOMC which 
comprises the seven members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four of the remaining 11 Reserve Bank 
Presidents, who serve one-year terms on a rotating basis. The voting rights of the Board are 
permanent, whereas those for the Reserve Bank Presidents rotate on an annual basis. Rotation is a 
useful device in terms of information sharing and may limit the group size to a reasonable number. 
However, the rotation of voting rights may have its disadvantages in terms of regional representation 
and the provision of appropriate incentives to “non-voting” members. In contrast to the voting 
system of the Federal Reserve System, that of the Governing Council determines the allocation 
of the NCBs to country groups according to economic criteria (GDP weights and the aggregate 
balance of the monetary and ﬁ  nancial institutions). Gros (2003) criticises the new voting system, 
saying that it is not transparent, not internally consistent and, given the maximum number of voting 
rights is 21, not sufﬁ  ciently decisive to improve the efﬁ  ciency of the present voting system. Berger, 
de Haan and Inklaar (2003) favour more centralisation of monetary policy decisions, with more 
responsibility being assigned to the Executive Board. They see beneﬁ  ts in the new voting system 
in that it balances economic size and political voting power. By comparison, Fase and Vanthoor 
(2000) explain that the Federal Reserve System has a rather heterogeneous structure in terms of the 
balance between economic size and voting power, but owing to the rotation scheme and a key role 
for the centre, it is efﬁ  cient in terms of monetary policy decision-making. An analysis by Ulrich 
(2004), which uses different economic criteria, shows that the allocation of voting rights to regions 
is not much affected by the new system, which preserves the balance of votes between the centre 
and the regions in the Governing Council. This is remarkable because the Executive Board would 
otherwise have lost inﬂ  uence in terms of voting power given the enlargement of the Governing 
Council. As regards the likely outcome of the policy-making process, Bénassy-Quéré and Turkisch 
(2005) ﬁ  nd that the rotation system is likely to yield monetary policy decisions that are not much 
different from those resulting from a full centralisation approach, as long as the monetary policy 
rule focuses on the euro area average as it should. 
1  As underlined by Wim Duisenberg, the ﬁ  rst President of the ECB, Members of the Governing Council “do not represent their countries, 
they are forbidden to seek or accept instructions from any private or public body” (see Duisenberg (2001)).26
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A rotation system with two groups will start operating once the number of euro area countries 
exceeds 15. The ﬁ  rst group will be composed of the ﬁ  ve NCB governors from the euro area 
countries occupying the highest positions in the country ranking and will share four voting 
rights. The second group will be composed of the remaining governors and will share 11 voting 
rights. Once the number of euro area countries exceeds 21, the rotation system will be based on 
three groups (see below). 
As above, the ﬁ  rst group will be composed of the ﬁ  ve NCB governors from the euro area 
countries occupying the highest positions in the country ranking and will share four voting 
rights. The second group will then be composed of half of all the NCB governors and will share 
eight voting rights. The third group will be composed of the remaining governors and will share 
three voting rights.
To ensure that the governors with voting rights are from countries which, taken together, are 
always representative of the euro area economy as a whole, they will exercise voting rights with 
different frequencies which are pre-established according to objective criteria. The size of the 
groups and the NCB governors’ voting frequencies will be adjusted over time to accommodate 
any sequencing of euro area enlargement up to 27 member countries. At an appropriate stage, the 
Governing Council will decide on the exact implementing provisions by a two-thirds majority of 
all its members. 
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The  Executive Board of the ECB consists of 
the President, the Vice-President and four other 
members. Its main task is to prepare the decisions 
of the Governing Council of the ECB and 
implement them thereafter. The Executive Board 
prepares the meetings of the Governing Council, 
implements monetary policy in accordance with 
the guidelines and decisions laid down by the 
Governing Council and, in so doing, gives the 
necessary instructions to the euro area NCBs. The 
Executive Board is responsible for the current 
business of the ECB and assumes certain powers 
delegated to it by the Governing Council, which 
may include powers of a regulatory nature. The 
Executive Board also exercises organisational 
and managerial powers regarding the ECB and, 
in consultation with the Governing Council, 
decides on the internal structure of the ECB. The 
Executive Board represents the “hub” (i.e. the 
centralised component) and the NCB governors 
the “spokes” (i.e. the regional component) of the 
monetary policy committee. In such systems, 
the hub specialises in preparing interest rate 
decisions and developing an infrastructure 
that aggregates information on the overall 
macroeconomic conditions in the currency area. 
This sharing of tasks is appropriate for managing 
the potential trade-off between timeliness in 
preparing monetary policy decisions and regional 
participation, and helps to avoid any unnecessary 
duplication of tasks.
The Eurosystem’s process for appointing the 
members of the decision-making bodies has a 
number of similarities with that of the Federal 
Reserve System, but there are some major legal 
differences. For instance, the Federal Reserve Act 
stipulates that the region of origin is a factor that 
must be considered when selecting members for 
the Board of Governors – a dating back to 1913 
requires that they come from different Federal 
Reserve districts: “in selecting the members of the 
Board, not more than one of whom shall be selected 
from any one Federal Reserve district, the President 
shall have due regard to a fair representation of the 
ﬁ  nancial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial 
interests, and geographical divisions of the 
country”. There is also some empirical evidence 
that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
members are subject to a regional bias in monetary 
policy decision-making. For instance, a study by 
Meade and Sheets (2002) ﬁ   nds that a regional 
bias is more signiﬁ  cant for members of the Board 
of Governors than for Federal Reserve Bank 
Presidents.
Furthermore, the US Congress formally plays a 
far greater and more powerful19 role in the 
appointment process for the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. Nominations by 
the US President are subject to Senate 
conﬁ  rmation, whereas the European Parliament is 
not vested with the same power. Reserve Bank 
Presidents are nominated by regional bodies (i.e. 
the boards of directors of those banks), but their 
ﬁ  nal appointment is subject to the approval of the 
Board of Governors. Article 112(2)(b) of the 
Treaty states that Members of the Executive 
Board are appointed “from among persons of 
recognised standing and professional experience 
in monetary or banking matters”. Appointments 
require the unanimous agreement of the 
governments of the Member States at the level of 
the Heads of State or Government, on a 
recommendation from the EU Council, after it has 
consulted the European Parliament and the 
Governing Council of the ECB. Hearings by the 
European Parliament are conducted prior to the 
appointment of Executive Board members. The 
appointment of NCB governors is the sole 
responsibility of the Member State. Members of 
the Executive Board must be citizens of a euro 
area country.
4.2 THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY 
COMMITTEES
The academic literature provides a number of 
arguments on why committees should be in 
charge of monetary policy decisions. Maier 
(2007) deﬁ   nes the actual monetary policy 
committees (for the Euroystem this term applies 
to the main decision-making body, the Governing 
Council and not to its MPC, which is a technical 
committee) – in the academic sense – as the 
Note that US Congress has the power to pass legislation in the  19 
ﬁ  eld of monetary policy.28
ECB
Occasional Paper No 79
January 2008
body in charge of monetary policy decisions and 
characterises them as “a group of people sharing 
information and taking a decision together, on the 
basis of the information reviewed (and revealed).” 
Committee members need to gather and share 
information, and then evaluate it together in order 
to make a monetary policy decision. The structure 
of the committee and its rules of procedure are 
key constitutional features that can facilitate the 
decision-making process.
One of the central debates in monetary policy 
decision-making is whether committees or 
individuals make better monetary policy 
decisions. For a long time and contrary to what 
was implemented in practice by successful 
central banks such as the US Federal Reserve 
and the Bundesbank, it was widely believed 
in academia that individuals are best placed 
to make monetary policy decisions. The more 
recent literature, however, suggests that interest 
rates would be far better set by a committee. In 
their survey of central bank practices, Fry et 
al. (1999) ﬁ  nd that nowadays a large number 
of central banks use some form of committee 
structure when setting monetary policy. 
Theoretical considerations on the functioning of 
committees support the delegation of monetary 
policy decisions to a committee. The Condorcet’s 
jury theorem provides a theoretical rationale 
for this behaviour: it says that, because larger 
committees have more informed members, they 
are more likely to make decisions that are close 
to the “optimal” one (as opposed to smaller 
committees that have fewer informed members). 
In a normative sense, the theorem suggests 
increasing the number of committee members 
in order to move towards the best possible 
decision in the circumstances. In an extreme 
case scenario, however, this would imply a 
committee with an inﬁ  nite number of members, 
which would probably not work efﬁ  ciently 
in practice. In this respect, some of the rather 
strong assumptions underlying the theorem may 
be violated. For instance, committee members 
may not obtain policy relevant information at 
zero cost. Decision-makers face constraints 
in processing a large amount of information. 
They must rely on technical contributions and 
expertise from their substructures. To this end, 
the effectiveness of the work by committee 
substructures is critical for the timely availability 
and the high quality of the information needed 
for making monetary policy decisions.
Today, there is a growing consensus that group 
decisions – such as those taken by a monetary 
policy committee – outperform individual 
decisions (see Blinder (2004) and Maier (2007)). 
First, decisions made by a committee are usually 
better informed than when made by a single 
central bank governor. This hypothesis seems 
plausible, but difﬁ  cult to verify empirically due 
to the lack of comparable empirical data. Blinder 
and Morgan (2000) carry out “laboratory 
experiments” on a large sample of Princeton 
University students to test whether groups make 
monetary policy decisions differently. With the 
limitations of such experiments in mind, they 
ﬁ   nd that, provided that groups do not reach 
decisions too easily or too quickly, their 
performance would be at least as good as the 
average of their individual members. A similar 
exercise by Lombardelli, Proudman, and Talbot 
(2005) suggests that committees perform much 
better than the average of each individual 
member. Moreover, the possibility to learn 
about the underlying model can improve 
decision-making in a group context. Second, 
committee deliberations may reﬂ  ect a broader 
picture of the possible interpretations of the 
information available at the time of the decision 
(heuristics). Committee members have different 
skills, backgrounds and preferences, and may 
therefore contribute different heuristics to the 
discussion. Since a committee pools the views 
of all members, it is less likely to adopt extreme 
positions or to be dominated by individuals. 
Third, committees may be more transparent in 
the monetary policy decision-making process 
than individual decision-makers (see Box 4).20 
Fourth, decision-making by committees can be 
understood as a means of buying insurance 
against pressure from the government or the 
This switch to collective decision-making by a committee is the  20 
subject of ongoing research; see Blinder (2004), Blinder and 
Wyplosz (2004), and Fujiki (2005) for an analysis and a survey 
of the various reasons for this phenomenon.29
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media which would aim to inﬂ  uence monetary 
policy decisions. Fujiki (2005) argues that 
monetary policy decision-making by a 
committee may provide more incentive to 
stabilise inﬂ   ation in line with the announced 
goals and in line with the notion of a conservative 
central banker whose decisions aim to increase 
his/her reputation as an inﬂ  ation  ﬁ  ghter  (see 
Rogoff (1985)). In this respect, long terms of 
ofﬁ   ce can enhance decision-makers’ personal 
independence and give them the necessary 
incentive to conduct a sustainable policy over 
the medium term, while at the same time 
discouraging opportunistic behaviour.
However, decision-making by committee, 
particularly by larger committees, could entail 
disadvantages that would not arise when 
individuals take decisions. For instance, the 
exchange of information in groups may not be 
perfect for several reasons. When information 
acquisition has costs, bearing in mind that 
information is a public good, there may be an 
incentive to free ride. Mayer (2007) argues that 
the publication of (attributed) minutes of internal 
committee debates could limit free riding. It 
will, however, reduce the conﬁ  dentiality of the 
deliberations and may result in sterile discussions. 
In addition, committee members may feel they 
have to hide their “true” preferences and thus 
redraft the minutes to make them less informative. 
Even when free riding is not an issue, committee 
members may engage in strategic behaviour 
in order to exploit information asymmetries. If 
there are too many members in a committee, an 
individual member may feel that his/her vote 
would only marginally inﬂ  uence the committee’s 
decision, and thus instead of revealing his/her 
“true” preferences, may decide to engage in 
logrolling (see Bernholz (1974)). In addition 
to the heterogeneous preferences of committee 
members, agreement on decisions may become 
complex, more time consuming and less optimal. 
A committee’s ability to process information, as 
well as the quality of its decisions, may depend 
on the skills of its individual members and its 
advisory staff. Under certain circumstances, 
committees could fall into the trap of “groupthink” 
(see Sibert (2006)), i.e. in striving for consensus, 
members would rule out other potentially viable 
policy options. Such behaviour is particularly 
costly when a committee’s credibility is at stake 
(e.g. the monetary policy committee would 
focus only on the government’s ofﬁ  cial position 
on policy rates, deliberately ruling out any 
other interest rate path that may be implied by 
economic data).
A committee’s ability to process information 
may also depend on the practical way the 
discussion is organised, and in particular on 
whether a set of members (the hub) has been 
able to discuss the decision beforehand and on 
whether and when they are able to put a decision 
to the vote of the entire committee. If the hub 
has already discussed the decision, the decision 
may be subject to an intrinsic judgement bias 
in the sense that there is a difference in the 
accuracy of judgement between the hub and the 
spokes. Berk and Bierut (2007) ﬁ  nd, however, 
that the adoption of appropriate agenda-setting 
techniques – such as to vote on interest rate 
proposals at the end of the monetary policy 
discussions – could be a way of avoiding the 
possible crowding out of relevant information in 
monetary policy committees’ discussions. 
There may also be disadvantages related to 
the committee’s voting procedures or rules of 
procedure, and there may be trade-offs between 
different voting systems. Smidkova (2003) 
discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of different voting systems (see Table 2) and 
concludes that the more the voting system helps 
to deal with uncertainty, the less transparent it 
may ultimately be for external observers. For 
monetary policy decisions to be transparent, 
it is also necessary to determine the degree of 
unanimity sought by the committee in pursuit of 
its main goals. A voting procedure should aim 
to reveal the “true” preferences of committee 
members and the extent of agreement on a 
certain decision. Sometimes, depending on the 
shock that hits the economy, a trade-off may 
arise between the timeliness and appropriateness 
of monetary policy decisions. Too much focus 
on consensus may risk delaying necessary 30
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monetary policy decisions, but may be beneﬁ  cial 
in terms of pursuing a medium-term orientation. 
In the presence of uncertainty or of non-
linearity, monetary policy-makers may also 
face a “discursive dilemma”. When exercising 
judgement, the views of all committee 
members have to be aggregated in some form. 
The aggregation of heterogeneous views or 
preferences may cause various problems. In this 
respect, the outcome will depend on how the 
monetary policy decision is reached. According to 
Claussen et al. (2006), a premise-based procedure 
will, on average, result in better monetary policy 
decisions than a conclusion-based procedure. 
In practice, however, this distinction may be 
insufﬁ   cient, as monetary policy committees 
normally vote on the policy rates, and rarely on 
the underlying assumptions. Central banks that 
discuss and pre-announce an interest rate path 
for future policy rates, such as the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand, Norges Bank and Sveriges 
Riksbank, may constitute a possible exception in 
this regard, in that their choice of interest rate path 
is explicitly constrained by the use of a model 
and its assumptions. However, it may be relevant 
concerning the organisation of the discussion, i.e. 
whether the discussion follows a preordained and 
logical structure or is a succession of views on 
the best interest rate decision.
Table 2 Advantages and disadvantages of voting systems
Board members reach 
consensus
Board members vote 
individually
Governor decides
Description Policy-makers must reach 
consensus about the best policy 
reaction., They consider all 
available information + their 
individual judgements + the 
judgements of other board 
members
Policy-makers vote on the basis 
of all available information, 
including expert views on 
probabilities and pay-offs, + 
their individual judgements
Governor decides on the basis 
of all available information, 
including expert views on 
probabilities and pay-offs, + his 
own judgement
Major advantages Indirect disclosure of pay-offs 
and probabilities to other 
decision-makers and consensus 
are respected methods for 
dealing with uncertainty
Averaging of probabilities and 
pay-offs helps to deal with 
uncertainty
Easy and transparent (pay-
offs and probabilities of 
the Governor are disclosed 
indirectly)
Major disadvantages Time consuming; Lower 
transparency due to pay-offs and 
probabilities not being disclosed 
externally (policy bias can be 
indicated to compensate)
Differences between board 
members’ opinions are only 
averaged. If the voting pattern 
is not announced, transparency 
not so high
If experts are not valuable 
partners in the policy debate, 
no other method for dealing 
with uncertainty is added in the 
second stage of the decision-
making process
Source: Adapted from Smidkova (2003).
Box 4 
HOW TRANSPARENT ARE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES?
A comparison of monetary policy committees suggests that they may place different emphasis 
on transparency. Blinder (2004) observes that a collegial committee prizes solidarity and strives 
for group ownership of its decisions. The chairperson forges consensus and, where possible, 
seeks to achieve unanimity in the decision-making process. Conversely, in an individualistic 
committee, any differences of opinion are voiced and conclusions are reached by majority voting, 31
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4.3 THE MONETARY POLICY DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS AND REGIONAL DIVERSITY 
Cultural and economic diversity is a speciﬁ  c 
feature of the euro area, which plays a role in all 
phases of the monetary policy decision-making 
process (see Chart 6). Some ECB observers 
(e.g. Wyplosz (2003)) have raised the concern 
that this diversity, especially in the context of 
consensus voting, may lead to indecisiveness, 
increase the potential for policy errors or, at the 
very least, lead to delays in the monetary policy 
response of the Governing Council to economic 
shocks inﬂ   uencing the euro area economy. 
Experience thus far seems to suggest that the 
contrary is true as evidenced, for example, by the 
if necessary. Hence, individual members are 
allowed to express their preferences and do not 
always have to embrace the group’s decisions.
The chart shows the rankings of selected central 
banks in terms of transparency, which are based 
on the index by Eijfﬁ  nger and Geraats (2006) 
against Blinder’s (2004) “subjective” index of 
the degree of democracy. According to the study 
by Eijfﬁ  nger and Geraats (2006), the Eurosystem 
ranks similar to the Federal Reserve System in 
terms of transparency. This ranking, which may 
be biased towards inﬂ  ation-targeting  central 
banks, is based on ﬁ  ve criteria, namely political 
transparency (openness about policy objectives 
and institutional arrangements), economic 
transparency (release of the economic information that is used for monetary policy preparation and 
decision-making), procedural transparency (the way monetary policy decisions are taken), policy 
transparency (announcement, signalling and explanation of policy decisions) and operational 
transparency (the way in which monetary policy is implemented). The index for democracy 
takes into account a number of factors, including the size of the committee, the dominance of the 
chairman, and the participation of other voting members. In Blinder’s (2006) analysis, the Bank of 
England takes the lead in terms of “democracy” because group decisions are made by majority vote 
and members express their own views. The Governing Council of the ECB, which functions as a 
“genuinely collegial committee”, ranks among the most democratic monetary policy committees. 
In such committees, members compromise on group decisions and all members take collective 
ownership of the decisions. According to Blinder (2006), the FOMC under Alan Greenspan was 
also collegial, but more autocratic, because the Chairman managed to persuade the other members 
committee so that the group decision ultimately became the Chairman’s decision. Under Chairman 
Bernanke the FOMC’s interest rate decisions have become more democratic, implying a shift of the 
US in the chart to the right. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which has one governor in charge of 
monetary policy, provides an example of individualistic decision-making. In terms of transparency, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England take the lead, while the Swiss National 
Bank and the Bank of Japan are two of the most secretive. From the U-shaped pattern, Blinder 
(2006) concludes that a single governor can be as transparent or intransparent as a monetary policy 
committee. Overall, this comparison illustrates that, in practice, there be factors other than the size 
of committee and its procedures and communications that determine the preference for monetary 
policy transparency. For instance, such factors may be related to cultural aspects of the society, 



































y-axis: Rank on Transparency (high =>) 
Source: Blinder (2006), p. 15.
Note: “Euro” means “euro area”.32
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maintenance of stable prices and the anchoring 
of inﬂ  ation expectations in line with the ECB’s 
deﬁ  nition of price stability. The effectiveness of 
the ECB’s decision-making process is indicated 
by the overall success of its monetary policy 
since 1999, but also by its timely reaction under 
exceptional circumstances (such as those of 
11 September 2001 and the ﬁ  nancial turmoil in 
August 2007).
It is often overlooked in the academic debate 
that the federal nature of the Eurosystem has 
important advantages that contribute to the 
efﬁ   ciency of the monetary policy decision-
making process in the euro area. In particular, 
it enhances the gathering and sharing of 
information on relevant economic developments 
in the euro area, thereby contributing to 
well informed discussions at the level of the 
Governing Council. The federal structure also 
facilitates consensus building at the level of the 
Governing Council, as any relevant contributions 
to its discussions are agreed beforehand by the 
Eurosystem’s committees involving all euro 
area NCBs. This means that the discussions 
in the Governing Council focus more on the 
assessment of the arguments and hence saves 
time at the decision-making level. The federal 
approach has also helped in that it enables a 
wide range of audiences to be addressed, as 
required in a multicultural and multilingual 
currency area, and has therefore strengthened 
the accountability of the central banking system. 
The fact that the NCB governors explain the 
ECB’s monetary policy decisions in their own 
language and that the Treaty stipulates that all 
ofﬁ  cial publications be released in the national 
languages of euro area countries have helped to 
improve all communication by the ECB and has 
ensured that information reaches all citizens in a 
timely and comprehensive manner. 
The regional diversity across euro area countries 
heightens the potential for committee members 
not to reveal private information. As was shown 
in theoretical studies (see Green and Laffont 
(1979) and Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 
(1995)) and discussed by Sibert (2003) and 
Fujiki (2005), there is the more general issue of 
achieving incentive compatibility in monetary 
policy committees as a means to promoting 
timely monetary policy decisions. Accordingly, 
committees may be subject to strategic 
behaviour whenever its members engage in 
“self-interested” behaviour and do not fully 
share information. Opportunistic behaviour 
by individual committee members, combined 
with the existence of private information, 
may lead to a situation for which there is 
no incentive-compatible voting mechanism. 
Such joint decision-making processes may 
lead to outcomes that are shared by all its 
members, but that are inferior to decisions free 
of strategic behaviour. As experiments have 
shown, the outcome of group decision-making 
can be improved by changing the settings. 
For instance, in the presence of “repeated 
games”, information sharing typically works 
better because group dynamics may reduce the 
incentives for individual members to engage 
in non-opportunistic behaviour. In practice, 
the NCBs may have superior knowledge on 
national indicators and the ECB may have more 
timely information on area-wide indicators. In 
line with the above theoretical considerations, 
a prior discussion of economic indicators in the 
Eurosystem’s committees before the meetings 
of the Governing Council is a way of enhancing 
the sharing of information at the technical 
level, as well as among decision-makers 
(see also Section 5.3), and thus of countering 
the incentives for strategic behaviour. It also 
contributes to the assessment of the relevance 
of speciﬁ  c country developments for the euro 
area indicators, and thereby incorporates the 
diversity of economic conditions under which a 
central bank has to make decisions. 
To counter the above, we identify a number 
of features that explain how the Eurosystem 
minimises the risk of policy errors and succeeds 
in making timely decisions. First, there is the 
hub-and-spokes nature of the decision-making 
bodies, according to which a wide range of 
responsibilities are delegated to the Executive 
Board (e.g. the preparation of monetary policy 
decisions). The Executive Board acts with a 
clear euro area focus and contributes to the 33
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gathering and assessment of policy-relevant 
information. It gives a strong weight to euro 
area considerations in the discussions of the 
Governing Council. Second, monetary policy 
discussions in the Governing Council follow 
the logic of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, 
which is to conduct an economic analysis and 
a monetary analysis and then cross-check the 
information from both analyses. Although these 
discussions focus on euro area developments, 
national developments are also considered to 
the extent they are meaningful to understanding 
the area-wide trend. Furthermore, the view is 
held that the “one person, one vote” principle 
contributes to the euro area focus. Members 
of the Governing Council have equal voting 
rights regardless of the economic weight of 
their country, and it is the overall assessment 
by individual members that matters and not 
the country weight of the NCB. Moreover, 
the personal independence of members of the 
Governing Council forbids other national policy-
makers to inﬂ   uence their voting behaviour. 
Hence, national interest is less likely to play a 
role. Third, the use of a well structured monetary 
policy decision-making process, specifying 
the set of indicators to be monitored regularly 
and ensuring their regular and systematic 
consideration, encourages a premise-based 
approach, thus further limiting the use of national 
or speciﬁ   c considerations. Fourth, rules and 
“terms of reference” concerning communication 
are agreed regularly. In addition, all members of 
the Governing Council are obliged to present its 
collective view in public, regardless of whether 
they have individually agreed to or dissented 
from a decision. 
The Governing Council keeps the minutes of the 
meetings conﬁ  dential, but publishes the outcome 
of its deliberations immediately after the ﬁ  rst 
meeting each month.21 At 1.45 p.m. 
(C.E.T./C.E.S.T.) the ECB issues a press release 
that informs the public about the Governing 
Council’s monetary policy decision. Shortly 
afterwards, at 2.30 p.m.(C.E.T./C.E.S.T.), the 
President, assisted by the Vice-President, holds 
a that is broadcast live and lasts about an hour. 
During this press conference, the President reads 
the Introductory Statement, which contains a 
more detailed explanation of the decision against 
the background of the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy. In particular, the President explains the 
Governing Council’s assessment of future risks 
to price stability, and its judgement having 
cross-checked the information from its economic 
and monetary analysis. It also includes a view 
on  ﬁ   scal policy and structural reform 
developments. The Introductory Statement is 
followed by a question & answer (Q&A) 
session, which allows journalists to enquire 
openly about details concerning the speciﬁ  c 
monetary policy decision. A transcript of this 
Q&A session is published on the ECB’s website 
only a few hours later. Overall, the press 
conference contributes to the transparency of 
the Governing Council’s decision-making 
process for monetary policy matters. The 
publication of this “Introductory Statement” by 
the President immediately after the monthly 
press conference instead of minutes and voting 
records has contributed to the fulﬁ  lment of the 
Eurosystem’s organisation principle of speaking 
with a “single voice”. In addition to this, ofﬁ  cial 
communications are published in all languages 
(via the internet) in order to reach the ECB’s 
audiences in their respective language and 
thereby avoid linguistic ambiguities as far as 
possible. Finally, the use of technical committees 
and their substructures to gather and synthesise 
information ensures the best possible degree of 
information sharing before a decision is taken. 
This is supported by the internal rules of 
procedures for such fora which also have a euro 
area focus. All in all, these elements ensure that 
the country diversity of the Eurosystem is taken 
into account by the Governing Council when it 
makes its monetary policy decisions.
4.4 AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF 
MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES
As explained above, there is a sound theoretical 
basis for assigning monetary policy decisions 
Decisions that relate to the other tasks of the ECB, e.g. to  21 
payment systems, ﬁ   nancial stability, statistics, banknotes and 
certain legal affairs, are published at 3 p.m. (C.E.T./C.E.S.T.) the 
day after the second Governing Council meeting of the month.34
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to a committee, and it reﬂ  ects also European 
tradition. In the case of the ECB, the genuine 
monetary policy committee is the Governing 
Council (whereas the term Eurosystem MPC 
refers to a technical committee comprising high-
level experts from the ECB and the NCBs). 
Today, with the prominent exception of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and a few other 
central banks with autocratic structures, most 
central banks in the world rely on a committee 
rather than on an individual to make monetary 
policy decisions. When delegating responsibility 
for making monetary policy decisions to a 
committee, a number of elements, such as the 
committee size, the appointment procedures, 
a monetary policy strategy, a voting rule, and 
the channels for announcing policy decisions, 
need to be agreed. The international comparison 
below surveys existing practices in terms of 
monetary policy decision-making across central 
banks. We look at ten central banking systems 
(including the Eurosystem) that have shaped 
the central banking landscape in recent years, 
and highlight the main elements of monetary 
policy-making by committees (see Table 3 for 
an overview).
Recent decades evidence a trend towards the 
creation of larger committees in charge of 
monetary policy decisions. It is difﬁ  cult to draw 
robust conclusions on the “optimal size” of a 
monetary policy committee (see Fujiki (2005)). 
Overall, research suggests that the beneﬁ  ts of 
obtaining better information through a larger 
number of committee members have to be 
balanced with the higher costs of collecting and 
processing the information. Typically, larger 
central banks prefer to have larger committees 
in charge of monetary policy. In practice, a 
range of between 6 and 19 voting members 
covers most central banks in our comparison.22 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the 
notable exception because the committee has 
only an advisory function and only the governor 
is in charge of monetary policy decisions. In a 
recent survey, Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) 
suggest that the optimal size of a monetary 
policy committee depends on a number of 
factors, such as information uncertainty, size of 
the currency area and the degree of economic 
stability. For the euro area, they ﬁ  nd  that 
the optimal size would be approximately 18 
Governing Council members, while on average 
the optimal size of (non-euro area) committees 
would be roughly 5-9 members. This is in line 
with the ﬁ  ndings of Berger et al. (2006), which 
suggest that larger committees are typical of 
larger and more heterogeneous countries with 
strong democratic institutions, ﬂ  exible exchange 
rates and independent central banks. Several 
monetary policy committees have both internal 
and external members, who may work part-time 
or full-time on monetary policy issues. 
The growing independence of central banks has 
meant that the personal independence of policy-
makers has also had to be enhanced. Today it is 
widely acknowledged that the terms of monetary 
policy committee members should be longer. 
However, there is no indication on the “optimal 
length” of a term. In practice, terms of ofﬁ  ces 
are usually about six years and can be renewed. 
In the case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
the appointment of the central bank governor is 
linked to the validity of the policy target 
agreement (PTA), which is ﬁ  ve years. Members 
of the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank 
cannot be reappointed. Members of the decision-
making bodies are often appointed by a high-
ranking government ofﬁ   cial, typically the 
Minister of Finance. In some cases, hearings are 
conducted by a democratic authority in order to 
conﬁ   rm that the candidate has the necessary 
qualiﬁ  cations for the post. In the case of the 
Eurosystem, the Statute of the ESCB stipulates 
long terms of ofﬁ  ce as a rule: a minimum term 
of ofﬁ  ce of ﬁ  ve years for NCB governors, which 
is renewable, and a non-renewable term of ofﬁ  ce 
of eight years for the members of the Executive 
Board.23 These provisions were designed to 
In this respect an international comparison by Berger (2006) ﬁ  nds  22 
that, for a sample of selected developed economies, technical 
committees that gather information are on average larger than 
committees in charge of monetary policy decisions.
When the ECB was established in 1998, a system of staggered  23 
terms of ofﬁ  ce was applied for appointments to the Executive 
Board in order to ensure continuity. The ﬁ  rst ECB President was 
appointed for eight years and the ﬁ  rst Vice-President for four 
years. The other four members of the Executive Board were 
appointed for ﬁ  ve, six, seven and eight years respectively.35
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strengthen the personal independence of the 
decision-making bodies. In addition, as shown 
by an international comparison by Kuttner and 
Posen (2007), ﬁ  nancial markets are interested in 
appointment decisions. This is because new 
appointments may contain information about 
possible changes in the preferences of the 
committee and the way discussions will be 
conducted. Furthermore, they may trigger 
doubts about the credibility of the central bank. 
An analysis based on agent theory by Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986) would argue that such 
effects may arise when markets anticipate a 
change in the composition of the “hawks” and 
“doves” of the monetary policy committee. In a 
setting with a high degree of personnel 
independence, appointments are likely to alter 
individual preferences and give rise to peer 
pressure. According to the “Thomas Becket” 
effect, new members of a committee often 
change their behaviour once they have been 
appointed. In a central bank context, this would 
mean that new members become as adverse to 
inﬂ  ation as older members.24
Monetary policy committees have to deal with 
uncertainties. One way in which they deal 
with them is to base committee decisions on a 
(formal) monetary policy strategy that ensures 
a systematic and consistent assessment of the 
economic, monetary and ﬁ  nancial  indicators. 
Such an approach may help to build consensus 
in monetary policy committees, to enhance the 
credibility of the central bank and hence to better 
anchor inﬂ   ation expectations. While practices 
are converging with regard to the main elements 
of a monetary policy strategy, preferences 
across countries may still differ. In this regard, 
since the early 1990s, a large number of central 
banks have adopted a monetary policy strategy 
of inﬂ   ation targeting. Committees with an 
inﬂ  ation targeting strategy base their monetary 
policy decisions mainly, or exclusively, on the 
evolution of an inﬂ  ation forecast. Central banks 
for larger areas, such as the Federal Reserve 
System, the Bank of Japan and the Eurosystem, 
have chosen more eclectic monetary policy 
strategies based on a broader set of indicators 
in order to assess the economic outlook and 
the risks to price stability. The monetary policy 
committees of those central banks stress the need 
for robust monetary policy decisions in the light 
of a variety of uncertainties (on data, economic 
shocks, the transmission mechanism, etc.). They 
avoid mechanistic reactions to single indicators 
and policy rules and give less prominence to the 
inﬂ  ation forecast in their decisions, but at the 
same time emphasise the need to cross-check the 
indicators available. In this context, there is all 
the more reason for the strategy followed by the 
central bank to encompass and synthesise such 
information is made known to and understood 
by the public.
Another way of dealing with uncertainties 
is to design a voting system for a systematic 
decision-making process. The voting rule (either 
consensus or majority voting) must be respected 
by all members of the committee. The practice 
of consensus voting is consistent with the fact 
that the committee has collective responsibility, 
and has therefore enjoyed increased popularity 
in recent years. According to this rule, it is 
assumed that all members agree with the decision 
in the sense that no member strongly disagrees 
with it. By contrast, majority voting is based 
on the agreement of the majority of committee 
members present at the committee meeting. 
According to this rule, individual members may 
express their dissent, but ultimately they have to 
accept the majority decision. Most committees 
that pursue majority voting have an uneven 
number of committee members and/or give the 
chairperson the casting vote in the event of a 
tie. Moreover, the Bank of England stresses the 
accountability of each individual member of its 
Monetary Policy Committee to the public, but 
otherwise its accountability is collective. In 
the case of the Eurosystem, Article 10.2 of the 
The “Thomas Becket” effect is widely acknowledged to apply  24 
to individual decision-makers, and it may similarly apply to a 
committee that has collective responsibility for monetary policy 
decisions (see, for example, Eijfﬁ   nger and de Haan (1996)). 
Thomas Becket (born in 1118) was chancellor and a friend of 
King Henry II before becoming Archbishop of Canterbury in 
1162. When appointed, he changed his attitudes concerning the 
relation between state and church and had a number of arguments 
with the King. He was made individually accountable for his 
non-opportunistic decisions – i.e. he was murdered by followers 
of Henry II and later canonised by the Vatican.  37
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Statute of the ESCB envisages majority voting 
by the Governing Council on monetary policy 
matters. In practice, the ECB pursues consensus 
voting in line with the collegial responsibility of 
the Governing Council. 
Monetary policy decision-makers around the 
world agree on the importance of announcing 
monetary policy decisions in a timely and 
comprehensive manner. While press releases are 
the preferred way of announcing monetary 
policy decisions, the practice of holding regular 
press conferences after the policy meeting is 
gaining popularity (see, for instance, the recent 
example of Sveriges Riksbank). In order to 
explain the arguments underlying the decision 
to the general public in more depth and in a 
timely manner, additional tools are useful. For 
instance, regular ofﬁ  cial publications, such as 
Inﬂ   ation Reports and Quarterly Bulletins are 
standard. However, these communication tools 
have limitations in that they do not reveal 
individual policy-makers’ assessments of the 
economic outlook. In this respect, opinions 
differ regarding the potential usefulness of 
publishing minutes (which is normally delayed 
by a few weeks) and voting records. The Federal 
Reserve System, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of 
England and Sveriges Riksbank provide this 
information together with voting records, but 
some other central banking systems (including 
the Eurosystem) do not (see Table 3).25 In the 
case of the Eurosystem, the Governing Council 
informs the public about all relevant aspects of 
its deliberations in almost real time with the 
issuance of the Introductory Statement of the 
President after the meeting. Issing (2005) is of 
the view that the practice of holding extensive 
press conferences each month and of publishing 
an Introductory Statement ﬁ   ts well with the 
collegial nature of the ECB’s decision-making 
process and the speciﬁ  c  institutional 
arrangements of a supranational bank: “a 
decision is the result of collective deliberations 
and debate and cannot be reduced to a simple 
exchange of opinions”.
In order to ensure an efﬁ  cient  ﬂ  ow  of 
information in a decentralised central banking 
system,  monetary policy committees can 
delegate certain tasks either to a well deﬁ  ned 
internal structure or to committee substructures. 
Monetary policy committees only need a 
limited set of relevant contributions for making 
monetary policy decisions. The chief economist 
is often in charge of summarising an assessment 
of the economic outlook prepared by his/her 
staff. Sometimes internal substructures are 
employed. Typically, either the chief economist 
or the chairman may make a recommendation 
for the policy rate. Committee substructures 
are not normally directly involved in the 
monetary policy process. They usually support 
the governing bodies in more operational tasks, 
such as auditing, banking supervision, payment 
systems and other administrative issues. 
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee is special, however, in that it is 
directly involved in the process of forecasting, 
but does not interfere in other aspects of the 
central bank’s tasks. In the following pages, we 
show that the ECB is also special, as it includes 
economic projections prepared or commented 
upon by one of its committee substructures in the 
documents for the preparation of its monetary 
policy decisions. This has several advantages 
with regard to the functioning of the monetary 
policy committee: as advocated by Claussen 
et al. (2006), this makes the overall discussion 
more premise-based than conclusion-based as 
the discussion on projections clearly predates 
the discussion on their policy consequences. 
Furthermore, by providing all central banks with 
information on the content and outcome of the 
projection exercises, the issue of potential bias 
raised by Berk and Bierut (2007) is negated.
Article 10.4 of the Statute of the ESCB does not allow the ECB to  25 
release the minutes of its meetings or voting records, and instead 
states: “The proceedings of the meetings shall be conﬁ  dential. 
The Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its 
deliberations public”.38
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5   THE WORKINGS OF THE EUROSYSTEM’S 
COMMITTEES AND SUBSTRUCTURES
In line with the above clariﬁ   cation of the 
Governing Council’s role in monetary policy 
decisions, this section deals with the role of 
technical committees in the decision-making 
process and the regular interaction between 
committees at the different hierarchical levels. 
We outline the interaction among the ECB, 
Eurosystem staff and committees, and explain 
how it helps in the preparation of monetary 
policy decisions and contributes to consensus 
building at the level of the Governing Council. 
We also illustrate how experts from the ECB and 
NCBs interact in the process for compiling the 
Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. 
The ﬂ  exibility and adaptability of the committee 
structure – in conjunction with the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy – have helped to 
integrate the new EU Member States into the 
Eurosystem’s decision-making.
5.1 THE ROLE OF THE EUROSYSTEM’S 
COMMITTEES 
Eurosystem committees are not in charge 
of monetary policy decisions. According 
to the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the 
Eurosystem’s committees play an advisory role, 
whereby they assist in the work of the decision-
making bodies of the ECB by providing expert 
and/or technical advice to the Executive Board 
and the Governing Council. The widespread use 
of committees in so many areas reﬂ  ects the need 
to share information and coordinate the work 
of the ECB and of the NCBs. This need stems 
from a variety of reasons, for which three main 
rationales can be identiﬁ  ed:
•  First, the ECB constitutes only a relatively 
small share of the Eurosystem’s total staff, 
and considerable expertise is available at 
the national level in all areas related to the 
ECB’s monetary policy. 
•  Second, most NCBs have been in existence 
for much longer than the ECB. A committee 
structure is thus useful, as it ensures 
consistency with past policies and across 
countries, thereby securing a harmonious 
level playing-ﬁ  eld. 
•  Third, committees provide fora, in which 
best practices and technical expertise can be 
shared, and they foster cooperation within 
the Eurosystem at the staff and management 
level.
Committee work at various levels also 
enhances the effectiveness of the Eurosystem’s 
diagnostic and policy-making processes in 
terms of knowledge transfer, learning by doing 
and consensus building, to name just a few. 
All committees process a signiﬁ  cant  amount 
of data and information at the aggregate and 
disaggregate level and carry out a wide variety 
of technical analyses and research that form 
the basis of many documents for the decision-
making bodies (i.e. the Executive Board and 
the Governing Council). Hence, they allow the 
dispersion of information and research across 
the Eurosystem at an early stage and ensure that 
policy-makers have prior access to information 
available in the Eurosystem ahead of the 
Governing Council meeting where it is to be 
considered.
It is, however, not feasible to involve entire 
committees in very speciﬁ  c  discussions, which 
has led to the establishment of some substructures 
that assist the committees in their advisory role. 
For example, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy 
committee is supported by the Working Group 
on Forecasting (WGF), the Working Group on 
Econometric Modelling (WGEM) and the 
Working Group on Public Finance (WGPF).26 
Furthermore, some committees make use of task 
forces, i.e. groups of central banking experts with 
Like committees, substructures require annual plans and have to  26 
periodically report on their activities. Clearly, such substructures 
raise the issue of effectiveness versus efﬁ   ciency, the cost of 
which may not be negligible and should be carefully assessed 
vis-à-vis the intended and actual beneﬁ   ts at the moment of 
origination and throughout their lifespan. 39
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a mandate to address speciﬁ  c issues and fulﬁ  l 
certain tasks within a set time frame.27 In the 
pyramidal committee structure of the Eurosystem, 
the higher level – in particular the Governing 
Council – usually agrees on the procedures, 
composition and main tasks of the subordinate 
level. The output of subordinate committees – 
once agreed at this level – is routinely 
communicated to higher-level committees as 
input for their deliberations via letters, reports, 
memos and various types of presentation, etc. 
It is worth mentioning that, in recent years, the 
ECB has also promoted several networks for the 
academic analysis of speciﬁ  c topical subjects, 
such as the Monetary Transmission Network, the 
Inﬂ  ation Persistence Network and the ongoing 
Wage Dynamics Network. Such networks build 
on “coalitions” of NCBs and their experts with 
an interest in (and a willingness to contribute to) 
speciﬁ  c topics.28
5.2 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ECB AND THE 
NCBS
All decisions regarding the committee structure 
of the Eurosystem fall within the competence of 
the Governing Council. The Executive Board is 
in charge of deciding the internal structure of the 
ECB (i.e. the number of functional units and 
organisational principles); similarly the NCBs 
are responsible for setting up their internal 
structures.29 The regular cycle of the Eurosystem’s 
decision-making process comprises three main 
stages (see Chart 6).30
First, there is a preparation stage, which 
involves technical contributions from all 
Eurosystem staff and committees. The aim of 
this stage is to gather information and agree on 
technical contributions that may be relevant to 
the decision-making process. The fact that the 
Eurosystem’s committees comprise 1-2 national 
experts per country ensures that each euro area 
NCB provides input into the deliberations and 
is equally represented. ECB services make 
signiﬁ  cant contributions to the discussions by 
preparing notes that serve as a general basis for 
the discussions. While committee chairpersons 
are normally appointed by the existing 
committee participants, it is often the case that 
an expert from the ECB chairs these discussions. 
The Eurosystem’s committees all operate in a 
similar way; they have a well deﬁ  ned mandate 
which clariﬁ  es the range of contributions they 
have to prepare as input to the policy process; 
the working language is English; and there 
are regular meetings (typically once a month). 
Documentation and technical background 
information are made available to all committee 
members; their deliberations are conﬁ  dential; 
and reports are published on issues of more 
general interest, subject to the approval of the 
Governing Council. Committees can delegate 
work of a more technical nature to working 
groups with a speciﬁ  c mandate or to task forces 
that meet until the task at hand is accomplished. 
All contributions required for the policy decision-
making process are either prepared directly by 
the ECB and NCBs or are the outcome of the 
deliberations of the various committees in which 
Eurosystem staff interact. In all monetary policy 
preparations, the Executive Board takes the lead, 
and the Eurosystem’s committees and ECB staff 
assist. Contributions from the ECB staff cannot 
be sent directly to the Governing Council – 
they are always considered by the Executive 
Board beforehand, and, where necessary, the 
Executive Board provides guidance to on 
procedural matters and the content. The ECB 
Secretariat is in charge of transmitting approved 
documents to the members of the Governing 
Council. Regular contributions to the Governing 
Council’s deliberations on monetary policy 
As a general rule, task forces should consist of a limited  27 
number of NCB participants. Outside experts and/or third-party 
representatives may also be invited to take part in the meetings 
of substructures, when appropriate. 
Another network that has operated on a regular basis is the Heads  28 
of Research Network, the aim of which is to share information 
on reciprocal analytical and research agendas and to foster some 
form of cooperation on an informal basis.
In order to avoid the duplication of tasks in the Eurosystem, the  29 
Governing Council may agree on guidelines that are binding for 
the ECB and the NCBs. See also the discussion in Section 3.2.
In order to characterise the relationship between the ECB and  30 
the NCBs, the President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, has 
frequently used the metaphor of a sports team. Accordingly, the 
ECB has a dual role: it acts as the “captain of the team”, and, 
together with all the NCBs, it is a member of the team.40
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are sent by ECB staff to the Board member in 
charge of DG-Economics who then forwards 
the documents to the Executive Board for an 
initial discussion. Other documents that are 
produced only on occasion, but that may be 
useful for the Governing Council’s discussions, 
can also be sent via the Executive Board to 
the Governing Council. Contributions from 
ECB staff, for which the expertise of NCB 
staff is deemed important, may be discussed 
beforehand at the technical level of one of the 
Eurosystem’s committees in order to gather the 
views of NCB experts. The committee may then 
decide to forward the material to the Executive 
Board or to prepare a Committee Report which 
may be sent to the Governing Council via the 
Executive Board. Alternatively, it may inform 
the Governing Council about its discussions by 
means of a letter from the committee chairman 
to the President of the ECB, which could be 
accompanied by additional staff notes on the 
issue. In such cases, the President would approve 
transmission of the documents to the Governing 
Council.
Second, there is a decision stage, which involves 
the Governing Council and the Executive Board 
of the ECB. In line with Article 12.2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB, the Executive Board 
prepares the meetings of the Governing Council. 
This involves drawing up the meeting agendas, 
preparing the necessary documentation for the 
Governing Council and making proposals for 
future decisions.31 The Executive Board 
currently meets at least once a week, and 
formally acts by simple majority of the votes 
cast by those members physically present. In the 
event of a tie, the President has the casting vote. 
However, like the Governing Council, in 
practice the Executive Board acts as a collegial 
body and practices consensus voting.32 Monetary 
policy decisions are based on intense discussions 
on the risks to price stability for the euro area 
and are made at the level of the Governing 
Council under the leadership of the President. In 
this regard, the Executive Board has a special 
role, because its members take the lead in 
monetary policy preparations and, as members 
of the Governing Council, they vote on monetary 
policy decisions. Thus far, all interest rate 
decisions have been taken by consensus. The 
Governing Council, however, has not provided 
an operational deﬁ  nition of what “consensus” 
actually means in this regard. The Governing 
Council usually meets twice a month in 
Frankfurt.33 The schedules for the meetings are 
available on the ECB’s website two years ahead. 
At its ﬁ  rst meeting each month, the Governing 
Council assesses economic, ﬁ  nancial  and 
monetary developments and makes its monthly 
monetary policy decisions. At its second 
meeting, it discusses mainly issues related to the 
other tasks and responsibilities of the ECB and 
the Eurosystem.
Third, there is an implementation stage, in which 
the NCBs are closely involved. Once a decision 
has been made, for example on the policy rate, 
one of the Eurosystem’s committees (or ECB 
services) coordinates the activities of all the 
NCBs, which will then implement the decision 
in a decentralised manner and ensure that the 
Governing Council’s guidelines are followed. 
For instance, all regular monetary policy 
operations are conducted in a decentralised 
manner. There is a single tender and bids are 
submitted through NCBs’ operational functions 
(see ECB (2004) and ECB (2006a)).
There is an additional dimension to the monetary 
policy process that is not shown in Figure 5.1, 
namely the communication of monetary policy 
decisions, which is carried out in parallel to 
the monetary policy implementation. The 
Eurosystem relies on communication tools 
that most central banks in the world have at 
their disposal, such as press conferences, press 
releases, an introductory statement, monthly 
In practice, albeit not formally, the Executive Board has the right  31 
of initiative for decisions by the Governing Council. See Scheller 
(2006), p. 60.
Article 11.5 of the Statute of the ESCB states that “each member  32 
of the Executive Board present in person shall have the right to 
vote and shall have, for that purpose, one vote”.
Meetings of the Governing Council are generally held at  33 
the ECB’s premises in Frankfurt. However, since 2000, two 
meetings per year are held in a euro area Member State and are 
hosted by the respective NCB. Meetings are also occasionally 
held by teleconference, but any decisions may only be taken by 
written procedure.41
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bulletin with an editorial and speeches by 
members of the Governing Council. As is 
discussed and further explained in other 
publications (see ECB (2007a) and Blattner et al. 
(2008)), a close mapping of the ECB’s monetary 
policy strategy and ofﬁ  cial communications has 
enhanced the predictability of monetary policy. 
In contrast to some inﬂ  ation-targeting  central 
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Note: NCB refers to staff from the NCBs of the euro area countries. In 2008, the Eurosystem comprises x=15 NCBs.
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banks, such as Norges Bank and Sveriges 
Riksbank, the ECB does not regularly provide 
forward guidance to ﬁ   nancial markets by 
announcing a preferred interest rate path. The 
Governing Council has clariﬁ  ed its reservations 
about pre-announcing an interest rate path and 
has emphasised the importance of avoiding 
mechanistic reactions to a single indicator, 
forecast or interest rate rule (see ECB (2007a)). 
Instead, it relies on the capacity of ﬁ  nancial 
markets to make their own assessment based 
on all the information available with regard to 
the economic conditions in the euro area and the 
world economy (see also Annex 2). 
5.3 THE PREPARATION OF MONETARY POLICY 
DECISIONS 
A REGULAR  PREPARATION
When setting interest rates, the Governing 
Council of the ECB applies a monetary policy 
strategy (see Chart 7), consisting of a deﬁ  nition 
of price stability and an economic and monetary 
analysis of the risks to price stability. The ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy was the outcome of 
intense discussions at all working levels of the 
ECB and the NCBs, and has been tailored to the 
needs of a large currency area. This stability-
oriented monetary policy strategy was adopted 
by the Governing Council in October 1998. It 
is based on two main elements: a quantitative 
deﬁ   nition of price stability, and a two-pillar 
framework which is the ECB’s own approach 
to organising, evaluating and cross-checking 
the information relevant for assessing risks to 
price stability in the euro area (for details on the 
strategy, see ECB (1999) and ECB (2004)).
The Governing Council regularly carries out two 
analyses, namely an economic analysis to identify 
the short to medium-term risks to price stability 
and a monetary analysis to assess medium to 
long-term inﬂ   ation trends. These two analyses 
are known as the “two pillars”. This framework 
makes a clear distinction between alternative 
explanations of the inﬂ  ation process as propagated 
by traditional schools of economic thought (see 
ECB (2003 and 2004)). The Governing Council 
has indicated that, for practical purposes, it is 
important to ensure robustness and to avoid major 
policy errors. It has therefore assigned monetary 
analysis the role of cross-checking, from a 
medium to long-term perspective, with the short 
to medium-term indications being suggested 
by its economic analysis. The economic and 
monetary analyses include a large number of 
relevant indicators that are monitored regularly, 
and a set of brieﬁ  ng documents discussing their 
evolution and addressing speciﬁ  c topical issues 
is made available to the Governing Council at 
its  ﬁ  rst meeting of every month. This ensures 
that the policy-makers systematically receive all 
relevant information in a systematic manner. All 
these documents are prepared by ECB staff. This 
information is usually reﬂ  ected in the Monthly 
Bulletin of the same month, after the Governing 
Council has made its decision on policy rates. 
The bulk of the information is focused on the 
euro area in line with the ECB’s mandate and 
strategy. However, supplementary brieﬁ  ng 
material on developments in the regions is 
prepared in order to deepen policy-makers’ 
understanding of the dynamic behaviour of the 
euro area economies and to account for special 
factors attributable to exceptional developments 
in just one or several countries.34 The President 
of the ECB acts as the “primus inter pares”, 
chairs the discussions and ensures that the rules 
of procedures are followed. The Board Member 
in charge of DG-Economics may submit a policy 
recommendation for the discussion and eventual 
decision of the Governing Council. After an 
internal debate, the President seeks agreement 
among the members of the Governing Council 
on the monetary policy assessment for the euro 
area, both in terms of the decision and the 
drafting of the Introductory Statement that will 
be presented at the press conference. 
While the ECB staff is in charge of the regular, 
monthly analysis of monetary and credit aggregates 
and of certain indicators in the economic analysis, 
such as developments in prices, wages, output, 
external trade and ﬁ  nancial indicators, the role of 
The documents circulated do not reﬂ   ect or prejudge the  34 
Governing Council’s evaluation of the information provided by 
both analyses.43
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preparing the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic 
projections is shared with the staff of the 
Eurosystem. The distinction between an economic 
and a monetary analysis implies a rather high 
degree of specialisation and the need to reconcile 
the interdependent information from both analyses. 
This leaves the decision-making bodies room for 
judgement, when evaluating and cross-checking 
the information from both analyses.
The Governing Council is in charge of cross-
checking the information from the economic and 
monetary analyses, and, if necessary, applying 
judgement when it comes to identifying the best 
monetary policy response to the circumstances. 
When making interest rate decisions, members of 
the Governing Council of the ECB place more 
emphasis on monetary analysis than most other 
central banks.35 These decisions require the 
thorough preparation and analysis of monetary and 
credit aggregates, as well as of other indicators, 
such as money-based inﬂ  ation-risk indicators for 
inﬂ   ation, money gaps, money demand models, 
P-star models and dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models which assign an 
important role to money.36 Every quarter, the 
Governing Council receives, at the same time as 
the projections, the Quarterly Monetary 
Assessment (QMA) note, which is undertaken by 
ECB staff and takes into account input from NCB 
experts.37 The key focus of the QMA is to quantify 
the contributions of the various monetary analysis 
tools to the inﬂ   ation outlook. The information 
contained in the QMA is made available to the 
public in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. The QMA 
is also presented to the Eurosystem MPC which 
regularly discusses in detail the techniques and 
models used in the context of such assessments.
As is the case for other central banks, such as 
the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of 
Japan, the ECB’s interest rate setting behaviour 
can, in principle, be modelled by means of a 
monetary policy rule. The existence of such a 
rule does not mean that the monetary policy-
making process could be substituted for the 
pursuit of an “optimal” interest rate rule. Such 
a rule is useful ex post – when there are no 
uncertainties – and for the assessment of the 
conduct of monetary policy. Full interaction 
at the various technical levels is required in 
order to cope with a number of uncertainties 
with regard to data, models and shocks hitting 
the economy. Moreover, the parameters of the 
ECB’s monetary policy rule could change over 
time (and may differ from that of other central 
banks). There may also be shocks that require 
different monetary policy responses to those 
implied by a “simple” monetary policy rule (see 
Gerdesmeier, Mongelli and Rofﬁ  a (2007)). A 
recent comparison of the ECB with the Federal 
Reserve System after 2001 by Christiano, 
Motto and Rostagno (2007) ﬁ  nds, for instance, 
that the ECB reacts somewhat differently to 
shocks. Such differences mainly reﬂ  ect the dual 
mandate of the Federal Reserve System, which 
implicitly forces FOMC members to give higher 
weight to an output objective, and differences in 
the structure of both the economies. The greater 
persistence of price developments in the euro 
area implies that the ECB has to move its policy 
rates less than the Federal Reserve System in 
order to stabilise prices. In addition, a number 
of empirical papers examining policy reaction 
functions suggest that the ECB’s monetary 
policy largely resembles that of the Bundesbank, 
with some modiﬁ  cations that mainly reﬂ  ect the 
differences between the structure of the euro area 
economy and that of the German economy (see 
Hayo and Hofmann (2006) and Smant (2002)). 
Furthermore, a mechanistic rule could render 
communication more difﬁ  cult, especially when 
economic developments call for a deviation 
from the path implied by the rule. 
Federal Reserve Governor, Ben Bernanke, clariﬁ  ed, for instance,  35 
that, initially, monitoring ranges for monetary aggregates played 
a prominent role in the FOMC’s deliberations, but that over time 
they had downgraded monetary analysis as a basis for making 
policy decisions. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve System 
continues to monitor monetary and credit aggregates in order to 
obtain information about the state of the economy (see Bernanke 
(2006)). More recently, Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank 
of England, (see King (2007)) made the point that the Bank 
of England’s MPC should pay more attention to information 
contained in monetary and credit aggregates. Similar to the 
Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England’s staff provide 
policy-makers with the results of their monetary analysis, 
typically enabling policy-makers to improve their understanding 
of the nature of shocks hitting the economy.
For an illustration of this, see ECB (2004). 36 
For a description of the tools used in the QMA, see Fischer et  37 
al. (2006).44
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B  THE EUROSYSTEM’S PROJECTION EXERCISES
Macroeconomic projections play an important 
role in the economic analysis of the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy, but, as illustrated above 
in Chart 7, they are only one input among others. 
These projections for euro area inﬂ  ation, output 
and other macroeconomic variables are produced 
jointly by experts from the Eurosystem and the 
ECB on a biannual basis, the other two times by 
ECB staff only, and are published every quarter 
in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin.
Information about the economic outlook of the 
euro area is a vital component of the policy-
making process. Before a decision is made, the 
Governing Council analyses a large amount 
of economic, ﬁ   nancial and monetary data 
with regard to their implications for future 
risks to price stability. The constraints faced 
by the Governing Council are determined by 
the structure of the economy and economic 
disturbances. Before every Governing Council 
meeting, the Executive Board circulates 
documents prepared by ECB staff summarising 
its latest assessment of the indicators monitored 
within the economic and the monetary analyses. 
Every third month, the brieﬁ  ng  material 
includes the results of Eurosystem/ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections, as agreed by the 
Eurosystem MPC and its working groups. 
Chart 7 The ECB’s monetary policy strategy
Monetary analysis Economic analysis
Cross
checking
Primary objective of price stability
Governing Council makes monetary policy decisions based 
on an overall assessment of the risks to price stability
- Output and its components (Q)
- Demand and labour market conditions (Q)
- Broad range of price and cost indicators (M)
- Fiscal policies (A+Q)
- Balance of payments for the euro area (M)
- Asset prices and financial yields (M)




- Counterparts of M3
- Loans to the private sector
- Money-based inflation-risk-indicators
- Measures of excess liquidity (money gap,
  deviation of M3 from the reference value, P-Star)
- Indicators of the monetary policy stance and interest rate
Monetary indicators (M)
- Staff macroeconomic projections (model-based)




Processing of information including:
yy
Analysis of monetary trends.
Focus on a longer-term horizon rather
than economic analysis 
y
Assessment of short to medium-term
 determinants of inflation
Note: With regard to the availability of indicators, A: Annual, Q: Quarterly, M: Monthly.45
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The Eurosystem/ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections are a convenient analytical tool for 
condensing a broad range of information on 
current and future economic developments. They 
provide a scenario for the euro area economy 
that will most likely materialise over a horizon 
of two years. Based on a set of assumptions, 
they combine the use of conventional models 
with economic experts’ judgement. Discussions 
among Eurosystem staff, as well as other 
tools, ensure the consistency of the results. 
The projection exercises are a regular source 
of information for the deliberations of the 
Governing Council. They do not, however, 
incorporate the Governing Council’s judgement, 
with the result that, in practice, the Governing 
Council’s assessment can deviate from the staff 
assessment. 
A noteworthy feature of the Eurosystem’s 
projection exercises is that the Governing 
Council does not interfere in the production 
process of any of these projections, which 
remain the sole responsibility of Eurosystem 
staff, although the Governing Council monitors 
the functional procedures of the MPC and 
its working groups. Hence, the Governing 
Council may draw different conclusions to 
those implied by the projections. At the same 
time, the Governing Council is informed of the 
progression of projections and of the rationale 
of the choices made at the technical level. In 
this way, tentative assessments and conclusions, 
which are mostly guided by academic and 
quality considerations, are clearly separated 
from the judgement of the policy-makers. The 
Governing Council may also receive detailed 
information on the assumptions made during 
the technical discussions of the Eurosystem’s 
committees. 
The preparation of the Eurosystem staff 
macroeconomic projections takes, on average, 
eight to ten weeks and involves extensive 
discussions among a large number of economists 
from the NCBs and the ECB. This complex 
interaction at the technical level is largely 
linked to existing constraints, such as the model 
infrastructure, the data collection process and the 
uncertainties related to long-run relationships 
in the early phase of EMU. Interaction between 
ECB and NCB staff has helped to produce 
high-quality forecasts and to build a common 
understanding of the main drivers of the euro area 
economy and of the future risks to price stability. 
Empirical evidence conﬁ   rms that it is indeed 
useful to incorporate national (i.e. disaggregated) 
information when forecasting area-wide (i.e. 
aggregated) variables (see Marcellino, Stock 
and Watson (2004)). It will require further effort 
to streamline the Eurosystem’s forecasting 
procedures, as a new generation of models that 
are capable of creating baseline forecasts with 
improved forecasting performance will need 
to be applied. DSGE models may be good 
candidates in that respect (see Edge, Kiley and 
Laforte (2006)). However, given the uncertainty 
about which model to use, the committee’s 
deliberations will continue to beneﬁ   t from the 
input from a suite of models rather than from a 
single all-encompassing model. 
Overall, the work of the technical committees 
saves the decision-making bodies a signiﬁ  cant 
amount of time when it comes to analysing 
the economic outlook and the underlying risks 
to price stability. The at times heavy and time-
consuming interaction between ECB and NCB 
staff (see Section 5.3) leads to a broad agreement 
on the assumptions behind the policy analysis 
and thereby offsets some of the disadvantages 
of having a large number of Governing 
Council members. In fact, contrary to what was 
sometimes argued by commentators, the size of 
the Governing Council has not prevented it from 
making appropriate monetary policy decisions 
in due time. 
C  THE FORECASTING PROCESS
In this section, we concentrate on the Eurosystem 
staff macroeconomic projections in order to 
illustrate the interaction of the Eurosystem’s 
committees with the other technical levels. 
This involves a series of relatively complex 
interactions between various business areas 
of the ECB, including Directorate General 
Economics (DG-E), Directorate General 
International and European Relations (DG-I) 46
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and Directorate General Research (DG-R, which 
maintains the models), as well as the NCBs. The 
Eurosystem MPC, which is composed of senior 
staff representatives of the ECB and the NCBs, 
takes the lead, assisted by WGF, regarding all 
technical matters. It provides the necessary 
guidance for producing the projections and the 
internal report on the Eurosystem staff projection 
exercise. The WGF comprises technical experts 
from the ECB and NCBs and is in charge of 
producing the ﬁ   gures and an initial draft of 
the report. Similarly, the WGEM develops and 
maintains the technical infrastructure needed to 
forecast economic variables, while the WGPF 
provides input on ﬁ  scal variables. In this way, 
discussions on models and techniques are usually 
clearly separated from the actual production of 
the projections. Moreover, discussions on public 
ﬁ  nance are also separated from discussions on 
economic developments. 
Twice a year, a fully-ﬂ  edged projection exercise 
is conducted involving experts at the technical 
level from the ECB and NCBs, while on two 
other occasions the ECB releases projections 
that are updated by ECB staff only. The aim 
of the exercise is to provide the Governing 
Council with detailed quantitative information 
on the economic outlook for the euro area. This 
information is summarised and explained in a 
Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections 
report. This report is not a genuine inﬂ  ation 
report, as issued by the Bank of England for 
example, or a monetary policy report as issued 
by Sveriges Riksbank, although its structure and 
content are nevertheless fairly similar. It contains 
detailed information about the projection 
assumptions and the economic outlook for the 
euro area as a whole. There is also a detailed 
assessment of price trends for a shorter-term 
horizon. However, it does not contain any 
information on longer-term price tends derived 
from monetary or credit aggregates; this is 
instead prepared separately by ECB staff within 
the monetary analysis. 
The projection exercise involves three principal 
steps which are described below in more detail 
(see Chart 8).38
Setting the Assumptions: At the beginning of 
each Eurosystem projection exercise, a set of 
provisional assumptions is agreed by the 
Eurosystem MPC, based on a proposal by the 
WGF established after discussion of an ECB 
staff proposal. These assumptions concern 
variables that are exogenous to the econometric 
models, such as interest rates, oil prices, non-
energy commodity prices (which are based on 
market expectations), exchange rates (which are 
based on the prevailing level in the two-week 
period ending on the cut-off date) and ﬁ  scal 
variables (which are based on national budget 
plans in the individual euro area countries). 
Projections are always conditional on variables 
that are exogenous to the forecasting models. 
Technical assumptions are prepared using the 
input on ﬁ  scal variables from the WGF and the 
WGPF. Deviations of the assumed and values 
from the observed values can be an important 
source of forecasting error. If there are any 
inconsistencies between the technical 
assumptions and recently observed outcomes, 
the Eurosystem MPC will request an update of 
the baseline forecast. Based on a set of projection 
update elasticities, staff can assess the impact of 
the updated assumptions on the projection 
ﬁ  gures. In June 2006, a change to the technical 
assumption concerning short-term interest rate 
was introduced: instead of a constant interest 
rate assumption, the interest rate path expected 
by the markets is now used.39 In order to run the 
forecasting models, sufﬁ  cient back data need to 
be available. Statistical experts at the ECB and 
NCBs are in charge of providing relevant high 
quality data in a harmonised format. 
For details on the tools and techniques of these exercises, see  38 
ECB (2001).
The assumptions about short-term interest rates, as measured  39 
by the three-month EURIBOR, are based on forward rates. 
This change was introduced with the aim of further improving 
the quality and internal consistency of the macroeconomic 
projections. It has changed neither the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy nor the role of projections, but has instead helped the 
Governing Council to make its discussions on future interest 
rates more forward-looking and facilitated, to some degree, the 
signalling of future monetary policy intentions.47
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Deriving the Projections: In a second phase, 
the ECB staff use the agreed assumptions to 
create an initial baseline projection for the euro 
area as a whole (based on the area-wide model 
and the multi-country model) and adjust the 
results in light of the judgement by sectoral and 
country experts. NCB experts contribute to the 
projection exercise by generating projections 
for a set of agreed variables for their country. 
To derive a euro area projection from these 
contributions, ECB staff aggregate the NCB’s 
country projections (based on their national 
models). The WGF analyses deviations of 
the NCBs’ aggregated projections from the 
area-wide projection by ECB staff in order to 
derive mutually consistent projection ﬁ  gures. A 
technical discussion of the results may involve 
a number of iterations and draws on the results 
of consistency tools that exploit the ex post 
validity of accounting identities. For instance, a 
trade consistency exercise is performed to check 
whether projected trade volumes and prices 
across euro area countries are coherent. Together 
with the consultation of the Eurosystem MPC, 
these consistency checks provide the basis for 
adjusting initial ﬁ  gures and building consensus 
on the most plausible ﬁ  gures. Meetings at the 
level of the Eurosystem MPC are useful to 
discuss the economic story behind the ﬁ  gures 
and to initiate further checks in the light of 
previous assessments of euro area trends as well 
as incoming information. At this level, one or 
two iterations are usually required for agreement 
on the ﬁ  nal macroeconomic projections for the 
euro area as a whole. 
Reporting on Projections: The Eurosystem MPC 
is in charge of the regular drafting of a report on 
the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, 
which will contribute to the deliberations of 
the Governing Council. The revision of some 
ﬁ  gures is still possible at the drafting stage in 
order to eliminate any remaining inconsistencies 
for example. All drafting rounds are supported 
by the WGF. In the event that it is necessary to 
update the projection ﬁ  gures to take account of 
unforeseen and sizeable shocks, the WGF uses 
a set of projection update elasticities to estimate 
the implied changes. Upon completion of the 
report, the chairman of the Eurosystem MPC 
sends the report to the Governing Council via the 
Executive Board. In parallel, ECB staff prepare a 
shorter version of the report for publication in the 
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. 
Chart 8 The forecasting process
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5.4 PREPARATIONS FOR EURO AREA 
ENLARGEMENT
Monetary integration in Europe was preceded 
by a long process of economic integration (see 
Section 2). Since the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was founded in 1957, the 
EU has so far been enlarged six times, and the 
euro area three times (see chart in Box 5). The 
most recent enlargements of the EU took place 
on 1 May 2004, when ten new countries joined,40 
and on 1 January 2007 when two new countries 
joined, namely Bulgaria and Romania. As 
regards enlargement of the euro area, Greece 
joined in January 2001, Slovenia in 
January 2007, and in January 2008, a further 
two countries have joined, namely Malta and 
Cyprus (see Box 5).
Namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,  40 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Box 5 
ENLARGING THE EUROSYSTEM
It is a feature of the functional integration 
process that all EU Member States fully 
participate in the single European market with 
the free exchange of goods, free movement of 
capital and people, and advancing liberalisation 
in services.1 They are also subject to common 
rules for competition, external trade, money 
and certain aspects of ﬁ  nance. In signing the 
Maastricht Treaty, Member States agree to 
start taking into account the implications of 
their monetary and exchange rate policies for the other EU Member States immediately, and 
to adopt the euro as soon as they have fulﬁ  lled the convergence criteria.2 The economic and 
ﬁ  nancial integration of the Member States with the EU15 is a complex issue that comprises a 
variety of different aspects which cannot be discussed here (see European Commission (2004)).
To be able to join the Eurosystem, a candidate country from the EU must comply with the 
economic convergence criteria and the legal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. This is meant 
to secure nominal convergence prior to the adoption of the euro and to ensure that, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, their integration will progress without tensions for the euro area 
as a whole. The convergence criteria do not specify how policies should be oriented or at what 
speed the euro should be adopted by the non-euro area Member States – an aspect that is not 
dealt with in this paper.3 Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty and the convergence criteria do 
1  In some EU Member States there are still some transitional barriers to labour mobility in place.
2  For further details, see ECB (2006b) and European Commission (2006). Note that for the United Kingdom and Denmark a separate 
protocol was agreed prior to the start of EMU. These two countries enjoy a special status, which gives them the right to choose whether 
or not to adopt the euro. Both countries exercised this right (Denmark in December 1992 and the United Kingdom in October 1997) 
and notiﬁ  ed the EU Council of their intention not to adopt the euro. Both countries can, however, opt in at a later stage.
3  There are in fact several considerations to balance. While all the non-euro area Member States have posted a rapid pace of nominal 
convergence with the EU, the record is much more mixed with regard to real convergence (see Angeloni, Flad and Mongelli (2007)). 
While the level of trade integration is quite high, convergence in output composition has been slower, especially if measured in real 
terms. This suggests that, while relative prices have moved ﬂ  exibly, part of the real adjustment process – which these price changes are 
supposed to stimulate – may be lagging behind.
Enlargement of the EU and the euro area
Number of euro area countries
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5   THE  WORKINGS 
OF THE EUROSYSTEM’S 
COMMITTEES AND 
SUBSTRUCTURES
In line with the arguments set out in Box 5, the 
integration of non-euro area Member States 
central banks into the Eurosystem is a gradual 
process that requires the effort of both parties. 
The governors of the non-euro area Member 
States’ central banks are members of the General 
Council, as they can only join the Governing 
Council when their country adopts the euro. Most 
non-euro area Member States will have to adapt 
their central bank institutions and their approach 
to monetary policy-making: these two spheres are 
interlinked, but are not identical. Furthermore, 
the single monetary policy is binding for all its 
members. This may require the non-euro area 
Member States to make some adjustments to 
their monetary policy frameworks prior to joining 
the euro area. Of course, this does not mean that 
all non-euro area Member States’ central banks 
have to introduce the same reforms at the same 
time. The participation of experts from the non-
euro area Member States in the Eurosystem’s 
committees in the pre-accession phase contributes 
to the setting-up of the infrastructure, as well as 
to the integration of these new central banks into 
the workings of the Eurosystem.
With regard to monetary policy decisions, the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy is sufﬁ  ciently 
ﬂ  exible to allow for the integration of the non-
euro area Member States. The ECB’s quantitative 
deﬁ  nition of price stability, inter alia, takes into 
account the considerable divergence in inﬂ  ation 
rates, thereby leaving some room for some 
the non-euro area Member States to introduce 
catching-up processes. The two-pillar monetary 
policy strategy was chosen to respond to the 
new circumstances prevailing in EMU. Cross-
checking indicators from both an economic and 
not specify how non-euro area Member States should operationally integrate into the decision-
making processes of the Eurosystem, or how to address the general challenges of EMU. In any 
case, both the Eurosystem and the non-euro area Member States need to be ready from a more 
technical and operational perspective (which is the main focus of this section). Preparations must 
therefore seek to maintain an environment in which monetary policy decisions can be taken 
in an effective manner. Overall, preparations for integrating the non-euro area Member States 
into the Eurosystem are progressing well. They have made considerable progress in terms of 
legal convergence, although further work is needed in some areas to achieve the required legal 
compatibility with the Eurosystem.4
The adoption of the euro in the non-euro area Member States may lead to “entry shocks” and 
subsequent economic adjustment. This has been the case for several current euro area countries. 
Against this background, policy-makers in the euro area and the non-euro area Member States 
require a good understanding of how the euro area economy functions in the presence of ongoing 
structural changes. This applies in particular to: (i) the internal euro area dynamics and their 
relation to global developments; (ii) the various transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
and their impact on price developments; and (iii) the transition of the non-euro area Member 
States to the single monetary policy. The fact that the exchange rate can no longer be used by 
national governments as a policy instrument requires careful planning in the transition from one 
regime to another. Moreover, likely changes in the behaviour of ﬁ  nancial markets in the non-
euro area Member States have to be closely monitored in order to see their effects on other 
markets, and banking supervision may have to be fostered. Overall, further preparations are 
therefore necessary to master the challenge of integrating the non-euro area Member States into 
the Eurosystem.
4  There are in fact several considerations to balance. While all the non-euro area Member States have posted a rapid pace of nominal 
convergence with the EU, the record is much more mixed with regard to real convergence (see Angeloni, Flad and Mongelli (2007)). 
While the level of trade integration is quite high, convergence in output composition has been slower, especially if measured in real 
terms. This suggests that, while relative prices have moved ﬂ  exibly, part of the real adjustment process – which these price changes are 
supposed to stimulate – may be lagging behind.50
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a monetary analysis perspective contribute to 
ensuring robust monetary policy decisions. This 
feature is also useful in the context of integrating 
the non-euro area Member States into the euro 
area, which increases data uncertainty. This 
choice of strategy also reﬂ   ects the desire to 
beneﬁ  t as much as possible from the credibility 
attained by its precursors. In this regard, a stable 
nominal anchor for inﬂ  ation expectations will 
facilitate the integration of the monetary policy 
frameworks of the non-euro area Member States 
into the Eurosystem’s single monetary policy. 
For the workings of the Eurosystem, it is important 
to ensure that monetary policy is implemented 
efﬁ  ciently from an operational perspective. As has 
been explained, the continued efﬁ   ciency of the 
decision-making process after enlargement has 
been ensured by the reform of the voting modalities 
in the Governing Council (see Box 3), and by the 
internal structure that assigns the main role to the 
centre and a supporting role to the Eurosystem’s 
committees. Non-euro area Member States’ central 
banks are not involved in the Eurosystem’s 
operations, although those central banks that have 
already joined ERM II (see Table 4) are now 
implicated in the Eurosystem’s operational 
framework. ERM II links the currencies of the 
Member States outside the euro area to the euro. 
Participation in ERM II is voluntary  41 and helps 
non-euro area countries to maintain price and 
exchange rate stability in the transitional period 
prior to their adoption of the euro. It requires ofﬁ  cial 
agreement on a central rate and a standard 
ﬂ   uctuation band of a currency’s exchange rate 
against the euro (normally ± 15%; a unilateral 
commitment to narrower bands with no further 
obligation for the ECB is possible). In operational 
terms, exchange rate stabilisation is achieved by 
means of foreign exchange intervention and 
ﬁ  nancing at the margin, which are, in principle, 
automatic and unlimited, but which require bilateral 
consultations with a Eurosystem committee, the 
(MOC). According to the rules of ERM II, both the 
ECB and the respective non-euro area Member 
States’ central bank could suspend automatic 
intervention, if such intervention were to conﬂ  ict 
with the primary objective of price stability.
All issues related to the integration of the non-
euro area Member States and to the coordination 
of monetary policies are dealt with by the General 
Council of the ECB. A Biannual Monetary Policy 
Coordination Report (BMPCR) is prepared twice 
a year by the Eurosystem MPC. This report takes 
stock of the monetary policy objectives, strategies 
and intentions of the NCBs of the non-euro area 
Member States in relation to the monetary policy 
of the ECB. This coordination exercise brings 
together a vast number of background studies and 
analyses carried out by Eurosystem staff, as well 
as staff from the non-euro area Member States. 
This exercise also covers recent ﬁ  nancial  and 
macroeconomic developments and projections 
for both the euro area and the non-euro area 
Member States.
It should be noted that a few non-euro area Member States, such  41 
as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have been subject 
to a sizeable process of real appreciation (in part related to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, as well as to past undervaluations). 
These countries have therefore not yet joined ERM II. See 
Ca’Zorzi, Hahn and Sanchez (2007)
Table 4 Exchange rate regimes of the non-euro area Member States  (1)
BG CZ  DK  EE  LV  LT  HU PL RO SK SE UK 
Member of ERM II  Planned  No  ±2.25%  ±15%  ±15%  ±15%  No  No  No  ±15%  No  No 











Managed ﬂ  oat    X   X
Free ﬂ  oat  X
Other information(2)    IT IT IT  IT IT 
Notes: (1) Country abbreviations: Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), 
Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK). (2) “IT” means the central bank is 
pursuing an inﬂ  ation-targeting strategy instead of exchange rate-targeting. Information as of 31 March 2007.51
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6   CONCLUSIONS
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we explain the procedures used 
to regularly assess a multitude of economic, 
ﬁ   nancial and monetary indicators, as well as 
the mechanisms through which consensus on 
monetary policy decisions is achieved within 
the Eurosystem. We suggest that the federal 
structure of the Eurosystem and committee 
work at the various hierarchical levels are 
crucial for the smooth functioning of the 
monetary policy process and ultimately for the 
maintenance of price stability in the euro area. 
The committee structure of the Eurosystem 
and the close cooperation between ECB and 
NCB staff contributes to the fulﬁ  lment of the 
Eurosystem’s tasks and to the smooth running of 
the organisation. As foreseen in the Maastricht 
Treaty, a structure with centralised decision-
making and decentralised implementation has 
been chosen. The Eurosystem’s committee 
structure is special in that it allows the regions 
to play a sizeable role in the process of monetary 
policy-making.
We argue that monetary policy decisions should 
be made by a committee in a collective manner. 
While committee decision-making can be costly, 
it is superior to individual monetary policy-
making, as it ensures that all the information 
available is taken into account rigorously and 
that all aspects of a policy issue are thoroughly 
discussed before a decision is taken. Obviously, 
the efﬁ   ciency of monetary policy decision-
making by committees depends on their voting 
procedures and the extent to which the process of 
information gathering favours timely and robust 
monetary policy decisions. Today’s central 
banking practices show that monetary policy 
decisions are virtually all – with the exception 
of those of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
– made by a committee and not by a single 
policy-maker. In the words of Alan Blinder 
(2004), “monetary policy by committees” can 
be understood as a “quiet revolution” in central 
banking practices. In the design of monetary 
policy committees, a number of choices have to 
be made with regard to the size of the committee, 
the procedure for appointing members, the 
monetary policy strategy, the voting system, 
the communication policy and the committee’s 
substructures. 
There are advantages to the Eurosystem’s 
decision-making process, which is based on a 
two-tier, hub-and-spoke structure. The Executive 
Board of the ECB is in charge of preparing the 
monetary policy decisions and the Governing 
Council of the ECB has collective responsibility 
for the monetary policy decisions. The hub-
and-spoke structure of the system ensures both 
timely monetary policy decision-making and 
regional participation, while at the same time 
avoiding the unnecessary duplication of tasks. 
In this regard, it resembles the structure of the 
decision-making bodies adopted by the Federal 
Reserve System and the Bundesbank prior to 
EMU. Overall, our international comparison 
suggests that the ECB and other central banks 
show many similarities. For instance, in line 
with standard practice, economic projections 
prepared by staff through a committee 
substructure provide important input into the 
Governing Council’s policy-making. However, 
these projections do not have the same strategic 
relevance as for inﬂ  ation-targeting central banks. 
The Governing Council does not interfere in the 
production process of the projections, which 
remain the sole responsibility of Eurosystem 
staff. Nevertheless, there are still some major 
differences. The optimal size of a monetary 
policy committee depends on various factors, 
such as the size of the currency area. At the 
same time, the size of the technical committees 
may exceed that of the policy committees owing 
to their main focus on information gathering.
We  ﬁ   nd that an important aspect of the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy preparations is 
that committees in all functional areas process 
information by fully exploiting the expertise of 
ECB and NCB experts. The level of interaction 
between the ECB and NCBs in the three phases 
of the decision-making process – namely 
preparation, decision, implementation – vary, but 
in the light of the decentralised structure of the 
Eurosystem, the NCBs play an important role. 
We take the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic 52
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projections as an example in order to illustrate 
the workings of the Eurosystem’s committees 
in terms of preparing timely and high quality 
contributions for the decision-making bodies. 
Working through the Eurosystem’s committees 
and its substructures boosts the efﬁ  ciency  of 
the deliberations of the Governing Council, 
which sets interest rates based on consensus. 
The cooperation in the Eurosystem through 
its committee structure fosters operational 
efﬁ   ciency and will, at some stage, contribute 
to the realisation of a “system identity”, as well 
as the sharing of common values. Furthermore, 
the fully-ﬂ   edged committee structure has 
contributed to the smooth integration of the non-
euro area Member States into the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy decision process.53
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ANNEXE ANNEXES
1  THE BENEFITS OF CENTRAL BANK 
INDEPENDENCE
Until the 1970s, it was still widely believed 
that central bank independence was not an 
important element in the constitution of a 
central bank. The failure of macroeconomic 
policy in the 1970s then resulted in a worldwide 
surge in inﬂ   ation, high unemployment and 
macroeconomic instability. Further theoretical 
and empirical research yielded results with 
practical implications for the institutional 
design of central banks. Theoretical research 
then started suggesting that central bank 
independence is a suitable institutional 
device for addressing the problem of time 
inconsistency (see Kydland and Prescott 
(1977)). Accordingly, a central bank which 
promises to keep prices stable chooses a more 
accommodative monetary policy stance in order 
to boost employment in the short run, with 
relatively little initial sacriﬁ  ce in the form of 
higher inﬂ  ation. In the medium term, inﬂ  ation 
rises and the central bank either has to tolerate 
it or push output below potential for a while 
to restore price stability. Once the public fully 
understands this process, it will expect higher 
inﬂ  ation. In the longer run, higher inﬂ  ation, but 
no gain in output, is the likely outcome of the 
process (Kydland and Prescott (1977)). 
Making central banks independent from 
political pressure leads to lower inﬂ  ation  in 
the longer term as it strengthens the central 
bank’s commitment to price stability in 
the minds of the public. Another line of 
reasoning, according to Barro and Gordon 
(1983), suggests that there is an inﬂ  ation bias 
inherent in discretionary monetary policy. A 
binding central bank constitution can credibly 
guarantee its independence, thus sending a 
clear signal to the public that it can trust the 
central bank. Monetary policy decisions are 
taken without bowing to any political desire 
for more inﬂ  ation in the short term. In addition, 
by assigning responsibility for the maintenance 
of price stability exclusively to the central 
bank, there is an institutional framework in 
place that assigns clear-cut responsibilities 
to individual policy actors, thus providing a 
transparent framework that makes the central 
bank accountable to the public. 
Indeed, an empirical study by Alesina and 
Summers (1993) conﬁ   rmed the beneﬁ  cial 
inﬂ  uence of central bank independence in the 
pursuit of price stability (see Chart 9a)). In 
their analysis of several industrial countries, 
they provided a surprisingly robust ﬁ  nding 
that independent monetary policy authorities 
generally perform better in terms of maintaining 
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price stability than dependent ones. These 
results have been conﬁ   rmed by more recent 
studies examining other samples and country 
settings.
A few studies (see, for example, Posen (1993)) 
have challenged these results on three grounds. 
First, the reliability and validity of indices for 
central bank independence have been questioned. 
Second, the empirical relationship between 
central bank independence and inﬂ  ation would 
be sensitive to the sample period employed in 
the estimation, as well as to the use of alternative 
control variables. Third, as in the case of the 
Bundesbank, its good inﬂ  ation  performance 
was explained mainly by the public’s support 
for its price stability-oriented policies. For the 
period prior to EMU, Chart 9b) shows that the 
relationship between central bank independence 
and price stability still holds.
The studies on central bank independence were 
inﬂ   uential and led to far-reaching reforms of 
monetary constitutions around the world. A 
recent study by Arnone et al. (2007) conﬁ  rms 
that over the last two decades, signiﬁ  cant 
improvements have been made worldwide in 
terms of central bank independence. For instance, 
all euro area NCBs were made fully independent 
with the establishment of EMU, at the same 
time as other countries undertook signiﬁ  cant 
reforms that contributed to enhancing central 
bank independence, against the background of 
a global trend towards price stability that started 
in the early 1990s. These developments imply 
that, for the period after EMU, the beneﬁ  cial 
inﬂ   uence of central bank independence is 
difﬁ  cult to isolate applying the above technique. 
In an environment of price stability and with a 
high degree of central bank independence, price 
developments are inﬂ   uenced mainly by non-
institutional factors, in particular shocks hitting 
the economy. At the same time, this evidence 
may be also taken as an indication that central 
bank independence has successfully addressed 
the potential adverse implications of the time-
inconsistency debate on inﬂ  ation.55
ECB
Occasional Paper No 79
January 2008
ANNEXES
2  THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY
Generally speaking transparency means that the 
central bank provides the general public and 
the markets with all relevant information on 
its strategy, assessments and policy decisions 
as well as its procedures in an open, clear and 
timely manner. It helps the public to gain a 
better understanding of the monetary policy 
process and the intentions of policy-makers. 
Consequently, monetary policy committees 
today spend more time communicating about 
their policy objectives, the monetary policy 
framework, and their assessments of the current 
outlook. For instance, since the early 1990s, an 
increasing number of central banks – with the 
notable exception of the Federal Reserve System 
and the Bank of Japan – have been using a 
quantitative benchmark for its primary objective 
(i.e. mostly an inﬂ  ation target) as a supporting 
device for stabilising inﬂ  ation expectations (see 
Table 3). 
In communicating with the general public, 
further and potentially conﬂ  icting  dimensions 
of transparency, namely honesty, clarity and 
openness can arise (see Winkler (2000) and 
Issing (2005)). Accordingly, a more open 
approach to monetary policy communication 
will only enhance transparency, if it clariﬁ  es 
monetary policy intentions. For instance, several 
central banks have increased their guidance 
to markets on future interest rates by either 
commenting on market expectations of future 
policy rates or by announcing monetary policy-
makers’ preferred future interest rate path. 
However, such measures are only effective, if 
the public understands the conditionality of the 
policy-makers’ commitment to the economic 
outlook.
Hence, an increase in central bank transparency 
will not always improve a central bank’s 
performance in stabilising inﬂ  ationary trends in 
line with their objective. Demertzis and Hughes 
Hallett (2007) suggest that an increase in central 
bank transparency would not affect the average 
levels of inﬂ  ation and output, but would reduce 
inﬂ  ation and output gap volatility. By means of 
a similar analysis, it can be examined whether 
the alleged link between transparency and 
inﬂ  ation performance can still be made in an 
environment characterised by a high degree of 
transparency. 
We conducted a cross-country analysis for 
eight leading central banks (see Chart 10) 
using a transparency index from Eijfﬁ  nger and 
Geraats (2006) for the period 1998-2002 and 
the average inﬂ  ation performance for the period 
1989-2006. As shown by the dotted, horizontal 
line in Chart 10a, there is, at most, a loose 
relationship between the degree of transparency 
and inﬂ  ation performance in this sample. Again, 
Japan is an outlier because it suffered from a 
Chart 10 Transparency and inflation 
performance
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Notes: The index of transparency measures average “total” 
transparency for the period June 1998 to June 2002, and is based 
on Eijfﬁ  nger and Geraats (2006). Inﬂ  ation data are averages 
for the period 1989 to 2006 from IMF statistics, and inﬂ  ation 
variability is measured as standard deviation throughout the 
sample. The observation for the euro area refers to the sample 
1999-2006.56
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prolonged period of deﬂ   ation. Similarly, the 
horizontal, dotted line in Chart 10b suggests that 
transparency has had no beneﬁ  cial impact on 
inﬂ  ation variability since 1995, i.e. when most 
inﬂ  ation targets had become effective. 
The above analysis is subject to the more 
general criticism that it may neglect the possible 
inﬂ   uence of an important third variable and 
that the index for measuring transparency 
may only capture the overall transparency of 
a central bank, while speciﬁ   c elements, such 
as the quantiﬁ   cation of its goal, may matter 
most. In the case of the Swiss National Bank, 
for instance, its good track record in terms of 
inﬂ  ation stabilisation also reﬂ  ects factors, such 
as its high degree of central bank independence 
(as shown in Chart 9a and 9b), its credibility, 
and the well developed stability culture of the 
Swiss economy.
More generally, if a central bank keeps inﬂ  ation 
on target, it enjoys full credibility and so 
transparency no longer exerts a measurable 
effect on inﬂ  ation variability. Finally, the euro 
area’s initial experience is comparable to that of 
the United States, with inﬂ  ation slightly better 
anchored in Europe.57
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ANNEXES
3  ORGANISATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
EUROSYSTEM 
In 2005, the Governing Council of the ECB 
agreed on the following organisational principles 
aimed at promoting a “truly European culture” 
in order to facilitate joint committee work and 
master future challenges (see ECB website). Due 
respect is paid to the principle of decentralisation, 
which is at the root of the Eurosystem. 
1. Participation.  All members of the 
Eurosystem shall contribute strategically and 
operationally to the goals of the Eurosystem.
2. Cooperation.  All Eurosystem functions 
shall be performed in a spirit of cooperation and 
teamwork by the members of the Eurosystem.
3.  Transparency and accountability. All 
members of the Eurosystem shall act transparently 
and be fully responsible and accountable 
for the effectiveness of all Eurosystem functions.
4.  Distinguishing Eurosystem activities. 
Eurosystem activities performed by NCBs shall 
be clearly identiﬁ   ed and distinguished – to the 
extent possible – from those pertaining to national 
responsibilities.
5. Cohesion and unity. While respecting the 
legal status of its members, the Eurosystem and 
its staff shall act and appear as a cohesive and 
uniﬁ  ed entity. In that spirit and working as a 
team, the Eurosystem shall speak with a single 
voice and be close to the citizens of Europe.
6. Exchange of resources. The exchange of 
personnel, know-how and experience shall be 
promoted by and among all members of the 
Eurosystem.
7. Effectiveness and efﬁ   ciency in decision-
making. All Eurosystem decision-making 
and deliberative processes need to pursue 
effectiveness and efﬁ  ciency.  Decision-making 
shall focus on analysis and arguments as well as 
on expressing views in their variety.
8. Cost  efﬁ   ciency, measurement and 
methodology. The Executive Board of the ECB 
and the Governors of the NCBs shall manage 
all resources prudently and shall promote 
effective and cost-efﬁ  cient solutions in all parts 
of the Eurosystem. The ECB and the NCBs 
shall develop control systems and performance 
indicators to measure the fulﬁ  lment  of 
Eurosystem functions and their alignment with 
the objectives of the Eurosystem. Comparable 
cost evaluation and cost-reporting methods 
should be elaborated.
9. Exploit synergies and avoid duplications. 
Potential synergies and economies of scale shall 
be identiﬁ  ed and exploited to the extent feasible. 
Unnecessary duplication of work and resources 
at functional levels and over-extensive and 
inefﬁ  cient coordination shall be avoided. To this 
end, the Eurosystem shall energetically pursue 
organisational options that ensure effectiveness, 
efﬁ  ciency and prompt action, taking advantage 
of the experience available both at the ECB and 
at the NCBs through intensiﬁ  ed use of existing 
resources. The outsourcing of Eurosystem 
support functions and activities shall be 
considered against the same criteria, and shall 
take security aspects into account.
Source: ECB website.58
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